среда, 24 июня 2015 г.

Kalle Kroon's material about Baltic troops in the Swedish army during the GNW

Kalle Kroon kindly permitted me to place in my blog his very interesting material about Baltic troops in Swedish army during the Great Northern war 1700-1721. Source: Kroon K. „As a good and faithful servant.“ Estonians and Latvians in the Carolinean Swedish army at the end of the 17th century and  the Great Northern War with the reforms of King Charles XI as background. // Revue D’Histoire Nordique. Volume 18. 2014. PP. 75-98.

„As a good and faithful servant.“ Estonians and Latvians in the Carolinean Swedish army at the end of the 17th century and  the Great Northern War with the reforms of King Charles XI as background.


Abstract: As a part of integration process, during the rule of Charles XI and Charles XII the Swedish peasants' right for free access to serve in the army as well as the commitment to do so had transferred to Swedish oversea provinces Estonia and Livonia, and during the Great Northern War conscription created the national line infantry which had similar maintenance traits to Swedish infantry allotment system. As those  troops were regulated line troops, maintained through constant flow of goodqualified recruits, the historical term “land-militia“ is not properly suitable in this context.Also, at least two units, battalions of Saaremaa and von Hüene in Tallinn, consisted of Estonian peasants, were established as permanent troops in war as peace times. This kind of national mobilization was a new aspect in local provincial societies.

Keywords: Charles XI, Charles XII, reduction, serfdom, appertainment, Estonia, Livonia, Great Northern War, land-militia, conscription,allotment,estonians, latvians.


The Swedish Empire of the 17th century has been described in historical science as a distinctive historical phenomenon of its time, influenced by some very specific international factors and supported by military forces. Its backbone included mercenary troops created through voluntary recruiting but also, for the first time in Europe, national regular troops, which were first formed through coerced conscription and later, starting with the national reforms of the 1680s, via a contract concerning soldier maintenance between the state and the peasants. The free peasantry was an immediate partner to the state powers and that made it possible for the state to use them in the military, enabling Sweden to double its armed forces despite its sparse population. At the same time, the Swedish Empire was not a unified country either nationally or administratively. As shown by a Swedish historian Th. Eng, it was a conglomerate country with a nation comprising various people of different conditions and different systems of justice.[i]In reality, though, the core of the empire had started the process of developing into a unitary state due to the force of circumstances at the beginning of the absolutist reign of Charles XI, with an aim to integrate the semi-independent “foreign provinces” (that is, the areas of Estonia and Livonia situated in the areas of the present countries of Estonia and Latvia legally, socially, administratively and militarily to Sweden proper.  These were also reforms which forced the nobility to stand back, had early bourgeois features, and which have been called revolutionary in Swedish historical science. As it had been impossible for the Swedish central power to form national military forces due to the social characteristics and feudal barriers in Estonia and Livonia, the reforms of king Charles XI opened up such opportunity. The status of the Estonian and  Latvian peasants and their service in the Swedish army in the late 17th and early 18th century in Estonia and Livonia under Swedish rule will be discussed in the present article.


From serfdom to appertainment. A change in the social status of peasants in Estonia and Livonia.

In Sweden proper, peasants were free and their relationship with the state or the nobility, depending whose land a peasant lived on, was contractual. In Swedish provinces of Estonia and Livonia, however, almost all the manors were owned as donations by the German nobility and the peasants of Estonian or Latvian origin who lived on their property were serfs, unconditionally forced stay to the manor. The old-established right for the ownership concerning peasants was guaranteed to the manor by the tradition of feudal privileges. As the Swedish treasury had been exhausted by the activities of the custodial rule of king Charles XI and earlier wars, it was necessary for the state to reclaim the manors that had been granted to the nobility under the beneficial right. A great nationalization of manors, or reduction as it was called, was carried out in 1681 in the province of Livonia and towards the end of 1685 in the province of Estonia.It was done against nobilitys will. All in all, 54 per cent of manors were nationalized in Estonia, over 75 per cent in Livonia and  ¼ of all the land ownership in Saaremaa.[ii] As a result, the feudal system of  beneficial right had ended and was replaced by rental agreements.[iii] The abolishing of the serfdom in Estonia and Livonia during the reduction together with the popular myth of “good old Swedish time” has been among the liveliest debate topics in Estonian historical science.[iv] To the present day, the following facts have been established from the newly discovered archive materials.The rental contracts were concluded mostly with the formal owners,the nobility. King Charles XI of Sweden had the vision concerning the status of peasants in the nationalized manors: in the future, they should not be treated any differently from the peasants in Sweden, serfdom in the manors had to be abolished and freedom introduced;[v] also that the peasants are not serfs of manor tenants, but subjects to the king.[vi] The state administration of the province revealed a more specific public definition – from now on, peasants would not be serfs of former manor owners any more, but belong to the king.[vii]  In reality, the estate peasants were released from the personal serfdom to the nobility (in German Leibeigenschafft), but they came to be dependent on the state as they now belonged to the king's property (in German, Hörigkeit).  Figuratively speaking, in the nationalized manors there was the process of liberating peasants from the serfdom of the time and jurisdiction of, or Level A, and taking them through their status as king's subjects to Level B.The peasants received royal protection against the manor tenants,but as king stated, the masters of farms had to stay in the manor as they were conditionally rented out by state to the manor tenants.The reason of this was obviously to guarantee the incomes to the state from reduced manors. But there were also new qualitative features, like the conditional freedom given to the farmers' sons to serve in a profession that called for education, or in an army, until they fulfilled their professional duties reliably.[viii] At the same time the king had restricted also donation rights of remained nobility manors,which were now so-called “amended(actually restricted) beneficial rights”.[ix]   

Thus, the development of freedom can be seen here as successive, which was quite characteristic to the cameralistic peasant liberation of the early modern era. [x]While the king did set the aim that the peasants in Estonia and Livonia should not be treated differently from the peasants in Sweden, it would have been essential to sign free contracts of this nature between the state and the peasants as it was done in Sweden. But it was not done, and a lot of peasants considered themselves still as serfs as they were forced to stay in manors.So the Estonian and Latvian peasants remained dependent from the state, but inside of its regulations successively earned some freedoms for establishment outside the peasant society, they have not had earlier.

The nationalization of manors brought about the absolute power of the Swedish state over local knightly, agrarian and Roman laws, and with the help of new administrative laws, the state of Sweden managed to break through a very firm shield of privileges provided by a Baltic special order in the provinces of Estonia and Latvia, bringing about not only the new laws of state subjection for the peasants but also new responsibilities, including the right but also the conscription of peasants to serve in the army, which the intimidated Baltic nobility had warned the them against during the process of nationalization of manors already. So far, in the case of war, peasants could have only been used in a temporary territorial defense units with an irregular structure, and when the danger ceased the peasants were allowed to go home. Due to the privileges of the Baltic nobility and their full ownership of the peasants, it had not been possible for the state to employ Estonian and Latvian peasants as conscripts. With the invasion of Swedish absolutism to the Estonian and Livonian  circumstances there was a significant change and dissolving of feudal privileges. The tenants of state manors were not allowed to entitle themselves with their manor's name. The Livonian Diet as the noblemen's municipal authority was banned with the king's order. The local government, comprising Estonian and Livonian nobility and clergy as well as representatives of towns, had not been directly dependent on the Swedish Diet, but now the decrees of the latter were equally validated  in Estonia and Livonia.  In 1683, the decree of the Swedish Diet creating a so-called allotment system of soldiers was implemented in Sweden proper, liberating peasants from conscription while a certain number of soldiers, hired by same peasants, were engaged in the army in the condition of war and peace both(so called allotment system).   According to the transumption from January 3 and an instruction from February 21, additions to the decree of the Diet from 1683, peasants were still engaged as conscripts in the areas where contracts between the state and peasants concerning the allotment system had not yet been signed, so also in Estonia and Livonia.[xi] The decrees of the Diet were published in German translation in 1683 by Estonian general governance, and its Chapter XIV , “state infantry and cavalry” (Reiches Milice, so zu Pferde, als zu Fusse) stated the note about  conscription (in Swedish utskrivning, German Ausschreibung, old Estonian „Wälja kirjotus“). For that, male inhabitants between ages 15-60 had to be divided in groups, or so-called rotes. From these, young men suitable for active service had to be chosen.[xii]  According to the King's transumption from January 3, 1683, no provinces subject to conscription were exempt from making payments towards clothing, arms and salaries, following appropriate regulations.[xiii] Thus, we can  observe that after implementing permanent allotment contracts between peasants and the king in Sweden, similar regulations were applied to these peasants who were subject to be recruited as conscripts. 

Estonian and Latvian peasants right and obligation to serve in army

With these acts, the peasants of Estonia and Livonia did not only have the right to join the army but they were also obligated to do so. Texts for taking an oath at recruiting and articles on war legislation were translated into Estonian and Latvian. Moreover, the state recruited conscripts during the Great Northern War even in remained areas of nobility manors, which proves the actual breakthrough of  the Swedish absolutist central power even in the areas still held by the nobility.

There was still no mandatory recruiting of peasant conscripts en masse in Estonia and Livonia in the late 17th century as there was no real need for it. In spite of that, great numbers of peasants joined the army on a voluntary basis. Voluntary mobilization was in distinct contrast with the previous privileges of the nobility and it can be observed in a corporative letter of the Estonian knighthood to the king from July 4, 1681, complaining about large numbers of peasants joining the army voluntarily, which would be a violation of the nobility's privileges.[xiv]  This letter had been sent before the nationalization of manors in Estonia and cutbacks of the nobility's privileges, and it testifies to the massive joining of the army that had started a year before in Livonia as a new phenomenon in the society. The large numbers of voluntary recruits in Livonia, especially of Latvian origin, during the reign of king Charles XI were later, in 1701, reported to king Charles XII by the governor general of Livonia, Erik Dahlbergh, who also noted that those peasants were soon released from the army on the grounds of fraud, so that “it is improbable that anyone from this nation is still in the service”.[xv] This is confirmed by an order of Charles XI from 16 January 1685 to Livonia, not to recruit “non-German” people for the same reasons – fraud, deceit and desertion.[xvi] We hereby see a setback to the king's former promise. This did not shy the king from offering the same freedom, as we have seen, to join the army to Estonian peasants in the letter on reduction of manors from 31 July 1687. Fraud, which was the cause for the ban, was the most common violation in the army. The offense was deserting with the uniform and arms, which were then sold with profit on the black market, and then the process was repeated in a more distant troop.In spite of all the proportion of Estonians in Swedish army troops in Estonia and Livonia increased essentially. Moreover, according to a historian Otto Liiv,during Great Northern War at least 40 Estonian peasants succeeded to become officers of the Swedish army, the best known among them being captain Thomas Jörist together with his brother, lieutenant Johan Jörist. The former participated in the battle of Poltava and further obtained the rank of an oberst lieutenant (equal to lieutenant colonel) and later became the manor holder of Piiumetsa, belonging to a non-immatriculated nobility. [xvii]Both succeeded, just like peasant schoolteachers, in maintaining the freedom also to their successors during the following Russian reign, and the above-mentioned right to choose an occupation as granted by Charles XI was used as an argument in the defense of a schoolteacher and Livonian churchwarden Ignatsi Jaak even in the 1730s.[xviii] Common soldiers who had been recruited in the Great Northern War under the law of conscription and who believed,even together with a part of nobility, that they are free to choice their living place and profession after the Russian occupation in 1710 and dissolvment of troops, however, were considered as regular home guards and thus reclaimed as serfs by the restored local authorities of the noblemen, whose privileges had equally been restored by Russian authorities. [xix]

The Great Northern War and the beginning of recruiting of peasants as land dragoons

In Great Northern War Sweden was forced to fight in three fronts simultaneously. Even after the victorious battle near Narva on 20 November (according to the Swedish calendar) 1700, the situation remained distressing because the Saxon troops near Riga had not yet surrendered and the state of war with Russia still continued. Before moving to the vicinity of Riga it was necessary to reinforce the defending troops of Estonia and Livonia as after the departure of the main army under the king's leadership there would be only about 5,400 men left in the garrisons to defend the provinces. Therefore, 11 new infantry and dragoon troops were recruited on a voluntary basis in  Estonia, Livonia and Ingria during the year of 1700 to add about 6,600 men to the forces.[xx] However, voluntary recruiting meant direct expenditures in cash for the state. The treasury needed a cheaper solution. Therefore it was necessary to mobilize the people also on the basis of the Swedish Land Defense Law (Landes Defension) and in 1700, so-called estate or land dragoon squadrons were formed both in Sweden and its Estonian and Livonian provinces. To this end, the manor tenants were obligated to provide 2 dragoons from every 15 Hake (a fiscal unit, a halfacre), the pastors had to provide one dragoon from each parish and every wealthier burgher had to employ a dragoon at their own expense and provide him with a uniform, weapons and a horse. The rental taxes was said to be used to cover the expenses. In 1701, an additional dragoon was asked for extraordinarily from every above-mentioned category.   Those land dragoon squadrons of Estonia, Livonia and Saaremaa were formed, consisting of only 200 soldiers per unit as a rule. Later, land squadrons were joined with voluntary squadrons and they were maintained by the state according to a corresponding contract between a troop commander and the state, just like all the others troops recruited voluntarily. As these troops were extraordinary, however, the structure of land dragoon squadrons was made to comply with the structure of regular dragoon troops, so that there were dragoons, grenadiers and pioneers among privates. The line makeup of a Swedish dragoon squadron refers to a multipurpose type of troop – the dragoons had to be employable as vanguard intelligence and pioneers in building bridges etc and as well as a mounted infantry unit. Here it is interesting to note that although local peasants were not really favoured during army recruiting by the local authorities, there were extraordinarily many Estonian peasants in the land dragoon squadrons, so that they made up 40-60 per cent of the line makeup.  Concerning the age, land dragoons were between 17-35 years old, therefore at the best age for active service. The reason for the large numbers of Estonian and Latvian farmers has to be the fact that suitable male inhabitants, possible volunteers, of German origin had left the country due to the previous recruiting[xxi] and also the emancipation of peasants into the society at the end of the 17th century. 

Conscription of Estonian and Latvian peasants into the Swedish infantry.

Historical literature in common, describing the Great Northern War speaks, although just alludingly, about the land-militia in Estonia and Livonia, formed by King Charles XII in 1701. However, the authors have not acquainted themselves with the project that led to the creation of the troops, manner of their completion or the soldier list of the troops that are going to be discussed below in the general European context.

The continental and Swedish conscription in comparison.


In West and North Europe of the early modern era, regular line troops were mainly formed as mercenary troops through voluntary recruiting. Additionally, assisting troops could be created on the principle of land defense, for example there were milita forces formed in France in 1688, the so-called Milices Provinciales, to guard the state borders, be in garrison service and assist regular army through conscription, which was of a secondary nature.[xxii] In the Swedish Empire, however, regular armed forces were formed both through voluntary recruitment and already since the second half of  the 16th century, through conscription. The conscription of the Swedish infantry stood on the same basis as the other countries' land defense, but one main part was separated and turned into a regular and militarily employable force.[xxiii]To that extent, Sweden was in a different status, especially compared to the western European countries. In western Europe, troops that comprised conscripted soldiers did not grow into similar regular line units like in Sweden for several centuries up to Great French Revolution. Regular troops were rather completed through voluntary recruiting. As Matthew S. Anderson has indicated, France attempted to transfer militia men to the regular army during the War of the Spanish Succession „in effect a sort of ad hoc and haphazard form of conscription,“ referring then to Sweden where a distinctive feature could be observed: “In one state, however, there was a form of conscription which was not grossly inequitable and which produced a steady stream of good quality recruits.“[xxiv] Therefore, the term “Milice” (or “Land-Milice” )as a French loan word in Swedish and German historical sources cannot be interpreted  as a temporary and irregular militia force only, but it denotes as troop, including a regular army, especially the one completed from the country.[xxv] As Fenno-Swedish historian Nils Erik Villstrand pointed out in a debate with Anderson, however, that there was no waterproof barrier between the traditional militia and conscription in Sweden, but historical science has often failed to notice the long process through which the latter grew out from the basis of former. The conscription army that based itself on the Swedish land defense could be used,payed and trained as a regular line infantry without limitations.[xxvi] Men serving in swedish conscript or allotment forces were not “militia men” and their service was not “the milice service” but they were the land soldiers of the Swedish regular army. That was one of the main differences between Swedish conscription from that of the west-european countries.

King Charles XII's conscription orders to Estonia and Livonia.

What happened in Estonia and Livonia on the order of Charles XII and the Swedish army headquarters from 1701 onward confirms the above. Already in the mid-1700, provincial authorities had ordered the formation of land defense troops of irregular and temporary nature. Their structure and training was paramilitary and haphazard and therefore their efficiency was very low.[xxvii] More was needed. After a longer familiarization with the province borders, the Staff of the royal army issued in Laiuse castle on 10 January 1701 a project about not limiting the decisive power of the high authorities for the land defense in Estonia and Livonia after the war. The project expressed concern about the indefensibility of open land in the current war situation, and as the general army could not come back any time soon, it was mandatory to form Milice troops from the country inhabitants through a certain choice not only to avert enemy forces but the troops had to be especially able to join the army and support it if necessary. The whole affair had to stand on firm, steady foot and be regulated.[xxviii] Based on the project, a public circular letter was written on the same date, also affirmed by Charles XII.[xxix] After finding the heads for the troops, Charles XII advised them in personal letters that recruiting soldiers had to be from peasants through conscription (in Swedish utskrivning) by allotment, in other words, 10 conscripts per every 15 Hake.[xxx] Thus, it was the king's wish to create an armed force based on land defense obligation, where the soldiers had to be from among the general masses of those subject to land defense obligation, in other words, young conscripts chosen from the peasants. The structure of the troops had to comply with the demands for regular forces and their continual, definite periodical completion every spring was meant by the troops standing firm and being regulated. All in all, there is information about completion conscription from 1702, 1703, 1704, 1707 (in Lääne County), 1708 and probably also in 1709 and 1710.[xxxi]So we can see principally a steady flow of conscripts into the army. Additionally it was attempted, following the example of Sweden, to form a separate doubled unit, so-called “choice-men unit”(in Swedish utskott),which did not give any results in a war-torn country but was possible in principle.[xxxii] It is evident from the troop specifications that men who had belonged to the earlier irregular land defense force in 1700 already were also used.[xxxiii] Both salary rates and maintenance had to be equal to the other troops of the royal army.[xxxiv] As we can see, the 1701 order separated one part of the general land defense, which was regulated and transferred as infantry into common element of the army.  The final status of troops as in war and peace times permanent had to be decided by the king later and thus the meaning of troops as regular, should be read in context. The fact that conscription of young men from peasantry in Estonia and Livonia was carried out following the example of Sweden is also confirmed by contemporary chronic Christian Kelch in his chronicle.[xxxv]

Amount and structure of conscripted infantry in Estonia and Livonia

The conscription in Sweden was in essence an early mobilization en masse. Its limits were restricted by the status requirements and allotted mobilization. From the state's viewpoint it was necessary to mobilize by coerce soldiers who could then be used as appropriate and without time limit, which in essence meant lifelong service, usually within the best years of manhood. All in all, 5,000 men were considered in Estonia, but in reality the number was considerably smaller. In Estonia, 4 land regiments were formed by county: regiments of Harju, Viru, Järva and Lääne County. In Livonia, though, as advised by governor general Erik Dahlbergh, altogether 12 land battalions were formed by parishes or their associations, so that in his accounting the whole Livonia was to give 3,212 men for the first conscription. However, Livonia and Saaremaa together formed 14 land battalions. Dahlbergh was sceptical about mobilization of rebellious peasants and suggested forming battalions because it was supposedly easier to train smaller troops and at the same time re-employ more idle officers. He also argued that the surroundings of Latvia were already devastated by the enemy.[xxxvi] That turned out to be a faulty argument strategically. Firstly, the battalions were too small for active service. Secondly, there were many men left over in Livonia who had actually been listed but not taken to active service immediately and they stayed in reserve in the country. Thus, the number of people in active service in the battalion of Pärnu County comprised 255 land soldiers and 19 men in reserve in 1701, but in May 1702 there were 240 men in the lines and the reserve had increased to 200 men.[xxxvii] War activities in Livonia were critical in 1702 and fragmentation definitely did not work in the favour of the Swedish army in Livonia. An overview of the conscripted line composition in the Swedish army as well as its troops is given in Table 1.

Table 1
The figures of Estonian land regiments and Livonian land battalions


Estonian Land regiments                  Colonels                                 Line composition (appr.) 

Harju land regiment                          B. von der Pahlen                    1000
Järva land regiment                           O.Rehbinder                             500
Lääne land regiment                          H.Fersen                                   880                                         
Viru land regiment                            W.H.Hastfer                              660

Livonian land battalions                   Lieutenant colonels

Estonian district:  
Põltsamaa land battalion                   B.W. Taube                           300(400 in 1704)                   
Tartu land battalion                           H. Hastfer                             200(400 in 1704)
Nõo land battalion                             G.G. Wrangel                        260(370 in 1704)
Sangaste land battalion                     G.J. Plater                                    ?
Pärnu land battalion                          M.F. Wolffelt                            300
Viljandi land battalion                      H.J.Buddenbrock                      350
Saaremaa land battalion                    J.G.von der Osten-Sacken        500

Latvian district:
Koknese land battalion                      O.R. Tiesenhausen                    300
Tirzai land battalion                          J.F. Liphart                                260
Cesis land battalion                           F.W. Liphart                              200
Valmiera land battalion                     F.B. Liphart                               350
Aluksne land battalion                      W.J. Tiesenhausen                     100?
Valga land battalion                          R. von Lünow?                            ?
Turaida land battalion                       F. Rosen                                       ?

Sources and litterature: Krigsarkivet, Rullor 1703:18, 19, 1704:17;1710:16; Riksarkivet, militära samligen, admin. handlingar, M 758, M 759; Kroon, K. Kolme lõvi ja greifi all Põhjasõjas, 350-353.
As Järva county was essentially smaller than the others, its line composition remained significantly smaller than those of the other regiments.

In the publications in the Estonian language of that time such troops were called “landtroops” (Ma-wäggi) according to their respective counties, as Wirro-wäggi etc, or used the loan word “regiment”.  At the beginning of the 18th century, the translation for the general term “Land-Milice” for an army was not “miilits” in Estonian, but simply “Ma-wäggi”, meaning “land-troops”, as it has been mentioned above in this article.[xxxviii]

Estonian land regiment land soldiers were musketeers and grenadiers and in the field also piqueneers to the extent of 1/3. As dragoons were one of the most favoured type of troops of Charles XII,until 1705 one company in each regiment was formed as dragoons. The soldiers of Livonian battalions were musketeers, there is no information about grenadiers.

Table 2. The schematic structure of Swedish infantry regiment and the structure of Harju land regiment in May 1710. Ranks in brackets are given in Swedish.


The amount of musketeers also includes corporals and grenadiers.

Sources and litterature: Krigsarkivet(Swedish War archive), Rullor 1710:16; Laidre, M.”Svedskaya armija v Estljandii i Livljandii vo vtoroi polovine 17. v. (1654-1694)”(The Swedish army in Estonia and Livonia during the second half of 17 century),Tartu, 1987,282-283; Laidre, M. “Schwedishe Garnisonen in Est-und Livland 1654-1699”(The Swedish garrisons in Estonia and Livonia 1654-1699). Tallinn, 1990, 12.About the dragoon companies in Estonian land regiments see Riksarkivet, militära samlingen, M 758, Generall Extract af Mönsterrullerne för Innewarande Åhr 1701; and about Järva land regiment see Krigsarkivet, Rullor 1703: 18, 1704:17.

Soldiers taken to active service gave an oath to king Charles XII in their own mother tongue under the flags “to be a good, loyal and faithful servant” and disciplinary war articles from the army regulations were read out.[xxxix] The training was carried out according to the newest infantry training rules compiled by Charles XII in the spring of 1701 and printed in Tallinn. About the command language there is information that it was Estonian (and Latvian).[xl] As the conscription was carried out within a single ethnic group of inhabitants,the estonian and latvian peasants, the conscription army in Estonia and Livonia included 90-100 per cent of soldiers from one nation, i.e. Estonians in the Estonian governance or Estonians in the Livonian governance, and Latvians in the Latvian district of Livonia, which was different from the forces of multinational voluntary mobilization. Therefore, those troops have also been called national troops (National-Regimente) just like other one-nation troops in Sweden. Although the term “nation” had not fully formed in its current meaning in the early modern era, we can still observe the definition of a nation on a modern, ethnic basis. At the same time, the body of officers and non-commissioned officers was mostly either German or Swedish, just like in Swedish-Finnish national regiments. 


There could have been about 340,000 Estonians living in Estonia and the Estonian district of Livonia at the end of the 17th century after the crop failure and famine, out of those approximately 80-100,000 were men. In the Latvian district of Livonia there were possibly 130-140,000 Latvians in 1710. Altogether, about 7,000 Estonian (4,000 in Estonia and 3,000 in Livonia including Saaremaa) and 3,000 Latvian peasants were mobilized during the Great Northern War together with the complementary conscripts and voluntary recruitments, which was ca 10-15 per cent of the whole Estonian and Latvian male population. The percentage, however, is indirect as it is not very precisely known how many victims there were due to the crop failure and famine of 1695-97. All in all, infantry troops formed through conscription constituted up to 40 per cent of all the Swedish troops in Estonia and Livonia during the Great Northern War.

Boundaries between coercion and voluntary service

Swedish central power could choose between coercion and voluntary service. Compulsory service as to line composition was carried out directly by peasants. Although it was formally necessary in Sweden to have the population's approval for conscription, the central power always pushed it through. Charles XII has still noted in 1702 preparing conscription in Saaremaa that “also the population wishes to defend themselves with the whole battalion of a land force similar to Estonia and Livonia.”[xli]

Charles XII advised to take the artisans of smaller towns as non-commissioned officers but their recruitment had to be voluntary and without coercion. Nevertheless, the king's wish met the artisans' disapproval and therefore there was such lack of non-commissioned officers in troops in 1701-1705 despite the authorities' attempts of coercion that almost all the positions of non-commissioned officers were found vacant. Naturally, such a situation weakened the troops' ability to fight in the field and made the commanders doubt the established alignment of these troops. Mobilization of officers was voluntary and the positions were quickly filled with qualified and experienced specialists.[xlii]

Transformation of civilian taxes into military burden in peasant conscription-farms


According to the regulations from 1683 the maintenance of conscripts was the farm owners' responsibility and to that end, farms under conscription obligation in Estonia and Livonia were divided into groups, or “rotes”. One of those, the so-called master farm, offered a conscript – either a son or servant of the farmer - to active service. The other 2-5 farms of the rote were auxiliary farms to maintain the soldier. If this soldier deserted, he was not found and no replacement had to give, the farmer himself was facing mobilization. The soldier given by rote had to be paid and given a uniform, which in essence meant that the rote hired a conscript. In the first years the farms paid sometimes the salary by mutual agreement characteristically to the era, partly in cash and partly in kind. Thus, in Järva county, Mäo village, a farmer Oickesarve Laur paid his dragoon 10 rikstalers(state thalers). In Vodja village of the same county, a soldier visited his home unauthorized and later came back in mid-October and brought 4 talers with him. In Pruuna village, a farmer Andres Wetterock sent his son to the service and gave him 5 talers to go, in Korba village a soldier was paid 2 rikstalers and an ox in addition, then 3 more rikstalers but the soldier wanted 5 rikstalers more. In Linnape village, a farmer Lehtmetze Jahn paid the wife of his soldier 7.5 rikstalers and 1 “lof” (44,3 litres) of groats. In Oisu village, the conscript of a farmer Runa Maddise Tönno fled during the march and a new soldier was given in replacement who received 12 rikstalers immediately. In addition, the farmers were obligated to provide a cheaper  wadmal uniform coat with blue or yellow lining, ribbons, and a black hat, leather trousers, gloves, stockings, shoes and necessary cartridges, grenade breeches and belts. In Albu village, peasants bought their own new uniform equipment from Tallinn. By 1704, the salary in cash had been fixed at 8 rikstalers per year, that was the last contribution of Livonian soldier masters. The same amount was paid on the same latitude in Sweden for soldiers taken by conscription and allotment system. From 1704 onward, the army started the transfer to a blue and yellow broadcloth uniform provided by the state. The costs on a soldier's equipment and hire were  during conscriptions detracted from the farmer's civil taxes or the costs were accounted as liquid debt, and in addition the farmer was exempt from working for the manor, which was counted to be worth 8 rikstalers per 1 Hake in one year already during the time of reduction.[xliii] Liberation from that hated manor work encouraged the farmers to support soldiers. The civil taxes and tributes were transformed into war tax and master farms became paramilitary farms just like in Sweden and Finland. Swedish militaristic sustenance system had settled right in the Estonian- and Latvian-speaking peasantry. It is also interesting to note that while in civilian taxes the proportion of cash was minimal, it increased considerably due to the expenses on a soldier, which testifies to a significant acceleration in cash turnover in the wartime situation.[xliv] The state provided arms to all soldiers mobilized into active service – first machlock and later flintlock muskets, swords, pikes, bayonets and flags, as well as their food rations.[xlv]Thus, we see the maintenance of conscription troops as a synthesis of old conscription and principles of allotment system, newly adopted in Sweden, with a prospect of permanent allotment contracts between Estonian and Latvian peasantry and the state.

The quality and social status of conscripted recruits.

According to Christian Kelch, a chronicler, the conscripts were young peasants. Thus, in 1704 the soldiers of the battalions of Pärnu and Viljandi averaged 20-30 in age, the eldest being 40-50 years old and the youngest were the drummers of 14-15 years.[xlvi] Most of the men were either sons or servants of farmers but the recruiters also looked for those with prior arm-handling skills or who had been hunters. In this way in Latvian part of Livonia, a hunter Iggone Marten was taken as a conscript from Ungurs in the Latvian district, so that he could also train others. All in all, in Koknese battalion 117 privates out of 337 had either been hunters or shooters and now received a regular military training in the line forces.[xlvii] As it is evident from Tallinn garrison lists of 1703, 75 per cent of the soldiers in Järva regiment were married and in 1709, 419 non-commissioned officers and soldiers in a Tallinn garrison battalion of major Hüene had 224 wives and 280 children with them, and in Harju regiment, there were 448 wives and 49 children of 949 privates.[xlviii] All of them stayed with their men or fathers at the place of service, shared their lodgings and offered support in their hard service. Characteristically to pre-industrial era, the line between the military and civilian societies was rather flexible in the early 18th century and wives and soldier's children were quite an ordinary sight in the war camps. In social quality, conscripts with families exceeded the lumpen and  rogues who were often present in mercenary armies.

The dynamics of illnesses, fatalities and cases of deserting in Järva regiment in 1703-1704 as shown in the chart, the data generally coincides with the information concerning the average of the Swedish army in Estonia and Livonia in the late 17th century, provided by Margus Laidre. It indicates that Estonian and Latvian conscripts were at the same level of health quality as the army's average.
  
Chart. Cases of illnesses, deaths and desertings in Järva land regiment in 1703 – 1704 in garrison duty in Tallinn.

It can be observed that cases of illnesses were more numerous in March when the body was the most prone to illnesses due to the lack of vitamins. For the same reason, the annual conscription was carried out in early spring as it was the time when conscripts saw the prospect of being on the crown's payroll as more favourable.

Sources and litterature: Krigsarkivet, Rullor 1703 : 18, 1704 : 17; Laidre, M.” Förluster och sjukvård i svenska armén i Estland och Livland under senare hälften av 1600-talet.”(The losses and medical care in Swedish army in Estonia and Livona during the second part of 17 century), Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok 1989, 44-45.

Conscriptions as a recruitment by force, had always caused some reluctance and desertions. Soviet historians have magnified the scope of deserting for political reasons,describing it as massive and trying to highlight the reluctance of Estonian and Latvian peasants “to the Swedish oppression of colonial rule and serfdom,”[xlix] which should be considered critically.So in autumn 1701 the chef of Järva land regiment Otto.Rehbinder complainted, that even the training had gone excellent,but because colonel lieutenant Eberhard Straehlborn acted too brutally by the training, a lot of soldiers had been deserted.  Sometimes, there was at times no clear distinction in being temporarily away without permission and actual deserting. There is no other way to explain the written records of Järva land regiment from the field camp positioned at the Narva River in 14 October 1701 how there could have been 76 deserted men and 387 men with corporals in line,[l] but at the end of November there were 509 men with officers in line.[li] The inquisition protocol of the administration of the governorate-general  of Estonia from October 1702 shows even more clearly that there were at least 61 men of those who had gone home without permission, problably for the haytime in summer and works in autumn, and after two-three or five weeks rather returned to the unit. In several cases they brought a sheep to the officer as bribe to escape punishment.[lii] It is evident that the discipline of the regular army was not yet quite clear to the peasants. After the above-mentioned investigation the discipline of the regiment was tightened. As seen in the muster rolls of the regiment from 1703-1704, the number of those noted as deserted decreased almost to non-existent, being 6 persons as maximum in autumn 1703(see the Chart above). The same could be said about other troops.[liii] At the same time, in 1702, the chief of a 1000-men Harju regiment, colonel Bogislaus von der Pahlen allowed even up to 300 men on leave to temporary vacation, that confirms von der Pahlens trust to his soldiers. During next years his regiment had in ranks: 839 soldiers in July 1704,863 soldiers in March 1705, 800 soldiers in March 1707( there were no conscriptions during years 1705-1707 to Harju regiment), and 997 soldiers in May 1710. So the desertion was like a disease that sometimes sparked out,and that was mainly cured out in following years of war.So it was also a question on social disciplining of the peasant class in early-modern society and an example about the level of the militarization of Sweden as great power.


Complementing the battalions of Livonia through voluntary mobilization and the state's plans for permanent troops after war

In 1703,eastern and central parts of Estonia and Livonia suffered severely under the plundering raid of B. Seremetjev, a Russian field marshal. As the farm rotes were ruined, the state had to take over the maintenance and complementary recruiting fully and since 1704 Livonia changed to voluntary recruiting as in mercenary troops. Hereby it is significant to note that the conscription units were not divided into mercenary or other troops, as it had often been done with militia units in European military forces, and they did not dissolve as Soviet historians claim,[liv] but as they had to be steady units according to the project from 1701 almost all of them constituted a nucleus of a single nation to which volunteers of all nations and social levels were added.[lv] (see Table 1- number of soldiers in 1704)

The proportion of the Estonians and Latvians was now to 75 per cent per troop in Livonian battalions. It is interesting that  the soldiers of Estonian origin got a German soldier name in several battalions. In the new muster roll of Põltsamaa battalion in January 1704, a name of a royal musketeer Päiwä Remo Hinrich was translated into German as Hinrich Weittzenfeld, Seppa Laur became Lorenz Schmidt and a musketeer Reino Ado was now known simply as Adam Flintsteen.[lvi] It probably testifies to the language change in the troop due to complementary recruiting of German people. The battalions of Pärnu and Viljandi were grouped together as Pärnu garrison regiment, in Latvian district the kernel of 700 men was put together from the battalions of Cesis, Aluksne and Turaida, which was later increased through voluntary recruiting into a 1000-men regiment in Riga under the command of colonel Carl von Mengden. [lvii] It is evident that the advantage of maintaining Estonian and Livonian army of land salary were stability and more or less guaranteed results, but its disadvantage was the vulnerability towards the enemy raids. By 1710, Harju regiment was the only troop in Estonia and Livonia completed solely through conscription as before.[lviii]

A special attention must be paid to the central power's plans to turn the new troops finally into permanent troops, which could be in service in times of war and peace both.  According to the entries of state budget office (Stats-Contoiret) from 1703 and 1704, Saaremaa battalion has been entered as part of an ordinary budget,[lix] which allows for understanding that it was a permanent troop. After the town of Narva had surrendered to Russian army in 1704, the delivered the remains of Viru, Järva and Lääne regiments were added together into one kernel and reformulated into a 400-men garrison battalion of Tallinn, which was to stay as a permanent garrison troop under the command of major Carl von Hüene both in war and peace starting on 17 October 1706 with an affirmation of Charles XII.[lx]  It was a kind engineer troop, which beside ordinary line service had also to be able to carry out construction works and there were 221 soldiers skilled at masonry and other crafts serving in this battalion.[lxi]The status of garrison battalions of Saaremaa and Tallinn was unusual because a completely new category had been counted into Swedish permanent troops as there were soldiers of Estonian nation solely. Besides, the new battalion in Tallinn was the very first permanent troop in Swedish era that had been especially created for the defense of this city. 


In the battlefields


In Estonia, the land regiments of Järva, Viru and Lääne County constituted a 2,000-men field army for the defense of the provincial border in the area of the Narva River with the base camp in Remniku. On 9 July 1702, those three regiments carried out a landing at Vasknarva on the Russian shore and put the Russian troops to flight in the battle at the secured positions. In the years 1702-1703, maneuvers followed in Viru County. The commandant of Narva, Henning R. Horn was afraid of an imminent siege of the town and he ordered the regiments of Viru and Lääne Country in the autumn of 1703 to settle in Narva. The regiment of Järva headed to Tallinn and from there in the summer of 1704 to help the town of Narva, which was under siege by Russian troops. All three regiments perished by the fall of the town, their remains retreated to Tallinn and were formed into the  garrison battalion of Tallinn.[lxii]

Harju land regiment was sent to the town of Tartu in Livonia in the autumn of 1701 and to the positions in Ahja where in winter 1701 part of the regiment was put to flight by Russian troops. By 1704 the regiment of Harju was drawn to Tallinn and in 1705 it participated together with other Swedish troops in a failed landing operation against Kronstadt, a Russian stronghold.[lxiii] The battalions of Nõo, Põltsamaa and Tartu were equally based in Tartu where they took up service in Tartu battle fleet together with the Harju regiment and they also participated successfully in the battles against the Russian fleet on Lake Peipus and near Pskov. The battalions of Põltsamaa and Sangaste took part in a battle of Hummuli in 1702. In July 1703 the battalions of Nõo and Põltsamaa set off for an expedition towards the Russian border and defeated the local Russian troop in the battle near Pechury.[lxiv] On 13 July 1704 the Russian troops surrounding Tartu in siege started an assault just at the place where the battalions of Tartu, Nõo and Põltsamaa were defending the weak medieval town wall. The battalions were able to hold the Russian troops back for the whole 8 hours of the storm with the help of other garrison units who had come to assist, without letting the enemy in the town, and accordingly to Russian czar Peter I even until 9 o´clock next morning,[lxv] which was a feat in the the early modern European war history. After the town capitulated, the remains of the battalions went partly to Riga, partly together with the regiment of commandant Carl Gustaf Skytte through Narva to Tallinn. In the district of Latvia, the battalion of Tirzai defended the areas of Gulbene and Aluksne where in December 1701 a much larger Russian troop was defeated.[lxvi] They also participated in the defense of Mõniste fortified manor in August 1702, but it fell to the Russians. The battalion of Valmiera was defeated by Russian troops on 15 August 1702 in Valmiera. The battalions of Aluksne and Konknese participated in the defense of Aluksne fortress, which was captured by the Russian army in August of the same year.[lxvii] But the battalion of Saaremaa had the longest warpath – it was joined with the corps of General Adam L Lewenhaupt in 1708 and participated in a battle of Lesnaja and in 1709 in the battle of Poltava.[lxviii] When Estonia and Livonia surrendered to Russia in 1710, the last remaining Swedish troops that had been formed in Estonia and Livonia were dissolved.


Summary

King Charles XI of Sweden fortified the status of the state power considerably in the provinces of Estonia and Livonia as a result of reforms in the 1680s. The Swedish peasants' right for free access to serve in the army as well as the commitment to do so had transferred to Estonia and Livonia, and during the Great Northern War conscription created the national line infantry which had similar maintenance traits to Swedish infantry allotment system. As those  troops were regulated line troops, maintained through constant flow of goodqualified recruits, the military-historical term “land-militia“ is not suitable in this context. Estonian and Latvian troops had a responsibility to defend a large part of the boarder and staff the garrisons. That brought about a sharp increase in the militarization of the country population, which was characteristic to Sweden and Finland during the era of the Swedish Empire. It was important to develop the militarization of Estonian and Latvian peasants towards permanent troops, culminating with the presence of troops like the battalion of Saaremaa in 1702 and the garrison battalion of Tallinn in 1706. These troops were to stay in the service even after the war. In a thesis of a English historian John A. Lynn  he sets the natural evolution before the early modern so-call military revolution in Europe. However, it has to be recognized through the examples of Swedish provinces of Estonia and Livonia that it was still the central power's revolutionary role in the late 17th and early 18th century that played an essential part in the military evolution of the provincial societies, to create a unified state body by coercion and capitalization through the early-bourgeois reforms and reduction of the nobility's manors to the state. 



[i] See Thorbjörn Eng,” Det svenska väldet.Ett konglomerat av uttrycksformer och begrepp från Vasa till Bernadotte.”(The Swedish realm.The conglomerate of expressions and conceptions from Vasa to Bernadotte).Studia Historica Upsaliensia 201,Uppsala, 2001.
[ii] Kalle Kroon,“ Kolme lõvi ja greifi all Põhjasõjas“(Under the three lion and griffin in Northern War).Argo, Tallinn, 2007,61-64.
[iii] Op.cit,68;see also Aleksander Loit,Die Abwicklung des Lehnswesens in Estland und Livland am Ende der Schwedischen Herrschafft.(Die baltischen Länder und der Norden.Festschrifft für Helmut Piirimäe,Nordistica Tartuensia 13, Tartu, 2005) 390,392.
[iv] About the latest debate at Historical Institution, Tartu University, see“Väitlus.Eesti-ja Liivimaa talurahva olukorrast Rootsi aja lõpus“(Abstract in english:The status of peasantry in Estland and Livland at the end of the Swedish reign),Ajalooline Ajakiri(Historical Journal)2013, 3(145),375-403.
[v] Riksarkivet(Swedish State Archive),Livonica II:259-Estlands generalguvernörens inkomna brev.King Charles XI to Lichton in 11. September 1681: “”…servituten afskaffas och frijheeten introduceras…”” and Aleksander Loit,”Feodaalkorra lagunemine Eestis”(The dissolvment of feudal order in Estonia), Ajalooline Ajakiri(Historical Journal)2013, 3(145), 380.
[vi] Riksarkivet,Estländska Reduktionskommissionens arkiv E:1. King Charles XI to reduction commission in 31. July 1687:““…bönderne kungiöras, att dhe äro Wåre Bönder och undersatare…““
[vii] Eesti Ajalooarhiiv(Estonian Historical Archive),F.1-2-33,l.252:””…Bauren, die nicht mehr ihre Leibeigene wären, sondern Ihrer Königl. Majest.zugehöreten…””
[viii] Riksarkivet,Estländska Reduktionskommissionens arkiv E:1. King Charles XI to reduction commission in 31 July 1687. This and the kings letter of 11 september 1681 has been published in Kalle Kroon,“Kolme lõvi ja greifi all Põhjasõjas, 317-324.
[ix] Friedrich Bunge,Beiträge zur Kunde der liv-,esth-und curländischen Rechtsquellen(Riga und Dorpat,1832),101.
[x] Even if not directly comparable, so by peasant liberation in Denmark in 1702 only those who were born after 1699 (2-3 years old in 1702!)gained liberty,and in 1733 the bondage to the manors(but not direct serfdom) was reinstituted for some cathegory of peasants – see Kalle Kroon,“Kolme lõvi ja greifi all Põhjasõjas“, 66.
[xi] Michael Roberts is not quite accurate in thinking that permanent allocation system replaced „old conscription.“It is more approriate to say, that it co-existed with the conscription because as late as 1710-11 the state had to implement an extensive conscription in the whole Sweden proper- see Michael Roberts, The Swedish Imperial Experience 1560-1718(Cambridge University Press. The Wiles Lectures, 1977), 140-141.
[xii] Lieffländische Landes-Ordnung 1683.Beschloss mit mit allen dazu gehörigen acten.Reval, 1683.(in Library of Tartu University).
[xiii] Kongl. Stadgar, Förordningar, Bref och Resolutioner, angående Swea Rikes Landt-Milice Til Häst och Fot. Första Del, Stockholm,1762,201-202: Transumpt 3 January 1683.
[xiv] Riksarkivet, Livonica II,vol.23, Protocollo Generalis Gubernamenti Regij per Esthoniam 4.7.1681.
[xv] Riksarkivet, Livonica II, vol.327, Erik Dahlbergh in 29 July 1701 to king Charles XII.
[xvi] Riksarkivet, Livonica II, vol.92, the resolution of Charles XI 16 January 1685.
[xvii] Otto Liiv,“Eesti ohvitserid Põhja sõjas“(Estonian officers in Northern War).Sõdur 3,1938, 69-71.
[xviii] Kalle Kroon,”Riigitalupoegade vaba ametivaliku võimalustest”(About the estate peasants free choice of profession), Ajalooline Ajakiri 2013, 3(145),388-389.
[xix]“Eesti rahva ajaloost Põhjasõja aastail 1700-1721. Valimik dokumente”(About the history of Estonian nation during the years of Great Northern War 1700-1721. A choice of documents).Tallinn, 1960,317
[xx] Kalle Kroon,“Kolme lõvi ja greifi all Põhjasõjas,“,93-94.
[xxi] Op.cit,96-98.
[xxii] John Lynn,A Giant of the Grand Ciécle.The French army 1610-1715,Cambridge University Press,2006, 381.
[xxiii] Sven A Nilsson,” På väg mot militärstaten.Krigsbefälets etablering i den äldre vasatidens Sverige”(On the way to military state.The establishment of military leadership in Sweden during the rule of early Vasas).Opuscula Historica Upsaliensia 3),Uppsala, 1989,9;Sven A Nilsson,” De stora krigens tid:Om Sverige som militärstat och bondesamhälle”(The era of great wars:About the Sweden as military state and peasant society).Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.Studia Historica Upsaliensia no. 161,Uppsala, 1990, 111.
[xxiv] Matthew Smith Anderson,War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime  1618-1789,London, 1988,50-51,90-94,92-93,111-121,174-175,
[xxv] So contemporary German Zedlers Lexicon from 1739 and Svenska Akademiens Ordbok gives to““milice““ and““ milis““in  17-18 century the same meaning- „a troop.“
[xxvi] Nils Erik Villstrand,” Anpassning eller protest.Lokalsamhället inför utskrivningarna av fotfolk till den svenska krigsmakten 1620-1679”(Adaptation or protest.The local population in front of conscriptions to infantry in the Swedish military power). Åbo Academy Press 1992, 42,45-47.
[xxvii] Kalle Kroon,“Kolme lõvi ja greifi all Põhjasõjas, 99-104.
[xxviii] Riksarkivet, Livonica II, 630,also other exemplar in 631.Ohnworgreifliches Project Lais,(10) January 1701:““dass Werck auf einem gutem beständigem fuss gesetzet und regliret werden möge…““
[xxix] Riksarkivet, Riksregistraturet, king Charles XII in 10 January 1701 to Axel Julius De la Gardie and Erik Dahlbergh.
[xxx] Riksarkivet, militära samligen, admin. handlingar, rörande armén, M 758,king Charles XII to O.Rehbinder 23 January and Wilhelm H. Hastfer 18 April 1701.
[xxxi] Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, F.1-2-704,55-60; Riksarkivet, militära samlingen, M 759, king Charles XII to Johan F. Liphart 10April 1702; Heldur Palli,“Kui Raudpea läks“(When the Iron Head has gone),Tallinn, 1967, 71.
[xxxii] Riksarkivet, Schlippenbachs Samling,M 1415, Wolmar A. Schlippenbachs concept of letter 12 November 1702.
[xxxiii] Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, F.1-2-664,206-212.
[xxxiv] Riksarkivet, militära samlingen, M 758, king Charles XII to Wilhelm H.Hastfer 26 January 1701 and the memorial from Lais with same date.
[xxxv] Christian Kelch,“Lieffländische Historia. Continuation 1690 bis 1707“(The History of Livonia.Continued from 1690 to 1707).Dorpat, 1875,246:““So werordnete der König eine Ausschreibung…von 1 ½ besetzten Haken ein guter junger Kerl…eben wie in Schweden zum Musquetierer ausgehen musste…““
[xxxvi] Kalle Kroon, „Kolme lõvi ja greifi all Põhjasõjas,“109, 350-353.
[xxxvii] Op.cit,109-110.
[xxxviii] Op.cit,114.
[xxxix] Riksarkivet, militära samlingen,M 759,Bogislaus von der Pahlen to king Charles XII 12 October 1701.
[xl] Riksarkivet, militära samlingen, M 758, Otto Rehbinder to king Charles XII and memorial 28 September-sub B.Rehbinder says, that the people are all good and knowing their exercises, exept one officer, Eberhard Straehlborn because he had no knowledge of Estonian language.
[xli] Riksarkivet, Riksregistraturet, king Charles XII to landchief Mannerburg in Saaremaa 11 November 1702.
[xlii] Kalle Kroon,”Kolme lõvi ja greifi all Põhjasõjas, 120-125.
[xliii] Op.cit,141-151.
[xliv] Op.cit,157-164. During peace time, the amount of money did not exceed some 26 öre(pennies) or 1 caroline in silver of their ordinary civilian tax burden, but in transformation of civil burden into expenses to soldier, the amount of sums in cash were up to 20 rikstaler(approximately as in poundsterlings).
[xlv] Op.cit, 146-178,.
[xlvi] Krigsarkivet, Generalmönsterrullor 1704, regiment of Schwenghelm.
[xlvii] Kalle Kroon, Kolme lõvi ja greifi all Põhjasõjas,128-129.
[xlviii] Tallinna Linnaarhiiv(Tallinn Town Archive),F 230-1-Be 36, Be 36 II.
[xlix] About soviet conception see Elina Öpik,“Eesti talurahva“Rootsi-truudusest“ Põhjasõja ajal“(About the“loyalty to swedish power“ of Estonian peasantry during Northern War)(Eesti ühendamisest Venemaaga ja selle ajaloolisest tähtsusest), Tallinn, 1960, 57-58,86-94.But even Öpik had to admit, that at the beginning of conscription, the peasants were eager to serve in swedish army, see 83,86. See also Heldur Palli,“Mezdu dvumja bojami za Narvu“(Between the two battles of Narva), Tallin, 1966, 106-110.
[l] Riksarkivet, militära samlingen M 758:Generall Extract af Mönsterrullerne för innewarande Åhr 1701.
[li] Op.cit, Otto Rehbinder to king Charles XII 29 November 1701, Kalle Kroon, Kolme lõvi ja greifi all Põhjasõjas,180-181.
[lii] Riksarkivet,Estländska generalguvernementets kamerala arkiv, vol. 22.1.Inkvisitionsprotokollet ang. landmilisen i Jerwen.
[liii] So in October 1701 there were no deserters in Viru land regiment, 16 deserters in Lääne land regiment,see Riksarkivet, militära samlingen M 758:Generall Extract af Mönsterrullerne för innewarande Åhr 1701. In October 1701 there were 4 deserters in Harju land regiment, accordingly the muster rolls from October 1702 there were 113 deserters, but 61 deserters in 1705 and 29 in 1708,see Riksarkivet, Schlippenbachs samling, M 1412, Carl G.Skytte to Wolmar A.Schlippenbach 12 October 1702 and an outcast about the Harju land regiment  15 October 1702,also Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, F. 1-2-664, 206-212 and Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, F 1-2-704,55-60. Accordingly the muster rolls from July 1703 there were 14 deserters in Põltsamaa land battalion, and only 10 deserters in Nõo land battalion(one with replacement), see Krigsarkivet, Rullor 1703:19.
[liv] See Heldur Palli,“Kui Raudpea läks,“71.
[lv] Kalle Kroon, Kolme lõvi ja greifi all Põhjasõjas, 184-187.
[lvi] Op.cit,135.
[lvii] Op.cit,185-187.
[lviii] Krigsarkivet, Rullor 1710:16.
[lix] Riksarkivet, Statskontorets arkiv.Kansliet.Personalstater 1704,vol. 25.
[lx] Kalle Kroon,“Kolme lõvi ja greifi all Põhjasõjas,191-192.
[lxi] Op.cit, 192.
[lxii] Op.cit,221,238-240,252,276-278.
[lxiii] Op.cit,235,281-282.
[lxiv] Op.cit,236-238,241-242,249-251
[lxv] Op.cit,270-274.
[lxvi] Op.cit,231-232.
[lxvii] Op.cit, 243-246.
[lxviii] Op.cit, 283-289.

4 комментария:

  1. That's a very interesting article, thanks for sharing!

    ОтветитьУдалить
  2. Спасибо, интересная статья, хотя и с этноцентрическим задором. Забавно читаются названия Сааремского, Цесисского и прочих батальонов.

    ОтветитьУдалить
    Ответы
    1. Такая традиция в эстонской историографии пошла еще минимум с Хелдура Палли. У него и названия финских полков шведской армии были даны не в традиционном шведском варианте, а в финском

      Удалить
  3. У Палли и сражение было не у Гуммельсгофа, а у Хуммули, и т. д., но зато у него именные и географические указатели правильные.

    ОтветитьУдалить