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суббота, 24 ноября 2018 г.

Отряд ладожского воеводы П.М. Апраксина в 1701-1704 гг.

В этом году, наконец таки, был напечатан сборник статей с конференции "Новгородика-2015". Сама конференция прошла еще три года назад осенью 2015 г., но сборник сверстали в 2017 г., а опубликовали только осенью 2018 г. Я на той конференции выступал с докладом о службах, численности и организации отряда ладожского воеводы П.М. Апраксина в 1701-1704 гг. В приложениях мною опубликованы таблицы с результатами смотренных списков по полкам на май 1703 г. и сентябрь 1704 г. Выходные данные статьи: Великанов В.С. Отряд ладожского воеводы П.М. Апраксина в 1701-1704 гг. // Новгородика-2015. От "Правды Русской" к российскому конституционализму: материалы V международной конференции 24-25 сентября 2015 г. Великий Новгород, 2017. С. 182-191. 

Отряд ладожского воеводы П.М. Апраксина в 1701-1704 гг.

Боевая служба новгородских воинских контингентов в годы Великой Северной войны до настоящего момента недостаточно изучена в отечественной историографии. Еще в конце 1700 г. служилые люди Новгородского разряда были разделены на две части. Во Пскове под командой Б.П. Шереметева должны были служить дворяне и дети боярские, стрельцы, казаки и пушкари Пскова и пригородов, Ржева, Торопца, Великих Лук и Зубцова; а в Новгороде с А.И. Репниным – новгородцы всех 5 пятин, а также служилые люди из Твери, Ладоги, Олонца, Торжка и Старицы. Уже весной 1701 г. большая часть «новгородцев» вошла в состав отдельного корпуса ладожского воеводы Петра Матвеевича Апраксина, и под его командованием воевала в 1702-03 гг. в Приневье, а в 1704 – участвовала в осаде Нарвы. В рамках настоящего исследования на основе впервые вводимых в научный оборот архивных материалов РГАДА показаны организация и боевые службы корпуса П.М. Апраксина в 1701-04 гг.

вторник, 31 июля 2018 г.

Sundberg U. Swedish defensive fortress warfare in the Great Northern War 1702-1710

A new dissertaion "Swedish defensive fortress warfare in the Great Northern War 1702-1710" by Ulf Sundberg was published this year in Abo (Finland). I find it interesting, but disputable. My main concern is about limited use of the Russian sources. You may find the full text here (link)

Short remarks on Sunderg's work you may find in Bengt Nilsson's blog (link)

вторник, 18 ноября 2014 г.

Action at Dersunisjki on 14/24 March 1702

On 13/23 of March 1702 a Swedish detachment under colonel of Adelsfanan i Sverige och Finland Alexander Hummerhielm (link) marched from Kowno to Jezno (modern Lithuanian Jieznas) to gather supplies & take artillery & ammunition from Jezno’s castle. It composed of 130 reitars of Ostgota Ryttare in 3 coys under Rittmeisters Otto Heinrich Schulman, Anders Blumenschold & Erik Gyllenbreider. Hummerhielm was also backed by a detachment under Captain of Livgardet till fot Gustaf Henrik Siegroth with 80 foot (30 from Livgardet till fot & 50 from Upplands). On 23rd’s evening Hummerhielm came at Dersunisjki. Where he was informed that a strong Lithuanian detachment under Michal Wisniowecki was somewhere close to him, but decided to stay there for a night.

суббота, 15 июня 2013 г.

Nilsson Bengt. Abraham Cronhjort and the defense of Ingria 1700-1703

Bengt Nilsson kindly permits me to put in my blog his material from the last historical conference in Artillery Museum (S. Peterburg): Nilsson B. Abraham Cronhjort and the defense of Ingria 1700-1703// Война и оружие: Новые исследования и материалы. Труды Четвертой Международной научно-практической конференции, 15-17 мая 2013 года. Ч. 3. СПб.: ВИМАИВиВС, 2013. с. 329-340.

On 11 February 1700 Saxon forces crossed the Swedish border in an attempt to take Riga by surprise. The next day Governor General Erik Dahlbergh sent Captain Johan Brask of the Nyland Infantry Regiment to Stockholm with the instruction to give Charles XII a full report of the events.[i] As the news spread across the Baltic provinces the Swedish army started to mobilize. The Estonian Governor General Axel Julius de la Gardie sent his own courier to Stockholm on 19 February, suggesting that the Finnish regiment should be given orders to march on Livonia. Considering the difficulties of getting letters across the Baltic Sea during the winter de la Gardie took the liberty of sending a similar request directly to the Finnish County Governors and regimental commanders. De la Gardies courier Captain Otto Magnus Wolffelt carried these letters through Estonia, Ingria and southern Finland, probably reaching Sweden by route of the Åland Islands. Wolffelt reached Charles XII at the very latest on 7 March, when Captain Brask (who had taken the route around the Gulf of Bothnia) had not yet arrived. The King immediately ordered a full mobilization of the Finnish regiments, but this had already started when the news from Riga reached Finland.[ii]
The regular Finnish forces were not very large. In each of the six southern counties there was one infantry regiment: Åbo (1,025 men), Björneborg (1,025), Tavastehus (1,025), Viborg (1,000), Savolax (1,033) and Nyland (1,025). There were also three cavalry regiments: Åbo and Björneborg (1,000), Nyland and Tavastehus (1,000) and Karelska (1,000), as well as a small unit of dragoons (500). To these can be added the Österbotten Infantry Regiment (1,200) and the Finnish companies of Adelsfanan.[iii] However, not all of these units were available. The Österbotten infantry was tied to garrison duty in Riga and in some other Livonian fortresses and the same was true for at least a couple of companies from the Åbo and the Nyland infantry regiments. Probably not much more that 9 000 men could consequently be counted on for the formation of a field army.[iv]  No reinforcements from Sweden could be expected in the foreseeable future, considering the season and the tension with Denmark.

вторник, 22 мая 2012 г.

Damages of the Noteborg fortress during Russian siege & inquest of it’s capitulation.


(I would like to thank B. Nilsson for his kind permission to use his materials. The post is based on his thesis presented at the conference hold in the Artillery Museum in S.Peterburg on 17 May 2012).  
When lieutenant-colonel Gustav Wilhelm Schlippenbach arrived in Narva after Noteborg capitulation on 21 December 1702, he immediately went to see GM Henning Horn and asked for an official inquest. Horn tried to dissuade him and said the matter could wait until the war was over, but Schlippenbach believed it was necessary to settle the matter while important witnesses were still alive. After repeated requests by Schlippenbach the inquest finally started on 5 February 1703. The records show that the issue aroused very intense feelings, possibly partly because Nöteborg was the first major Swedish fortress to fall and did so quite fast (in just over two weeks). Schlippenbach insisted that he capitulated when all capabilities to defend had been exhausted. Horn & some witnesses claimed that garrison could to resist & repulse Russian attack.
Schlippenbach’s opinion
Horn’s opinion
Fortress was in poor condition because of a lack of workers
Schlippenbach didn’t make required repairs
Garrison was very weak
Schlippenbach didn’t ask for reinforcements
There were 3 large breaches in the walls
Breaches were not large
The most part of garrison was killed or wounded
179 were available by the moment of capitulation
Grenades run out after 13 hours of the Russian assault
Grenades were used in wrong way. The assault was not serious
No any hope for reinforcements
Schlippenbach couldn't know it
Details about Schlippenbach forces you can find here (click). Please compare 2 drawings of Noteborg’s damages. One is made by Schlippenbach himself. It presents 3 serious breaches. The other is done by Jonas Carlsson Bergh, a konduktor of Swedish artillery, who participated in the siege. He claimed that breaches were not serious. Also I put a famous drawing by Adrian Schoobeck, who made it for Tzar.
Siege of Noteborg by G.W. von Schippenbach, 1703
Kindly provided by B. Nilsson
(Riksarkivet, Militaria, Karl XII: krig, Ritningar)
CLICK TO ENLARGE
Siege of Noteborg by J.C. Bergh, 1703
Kindly provided by B. Nilsson
(Riksarkivet, Militaria, Karl XII: krig, Ritningar)
CLICK TO ENLARGE
Siege of Noteborg by A. Schoonebeck, 1703
(Книга Марсова)
CLICK TO ENLARGE
The matter of inquest was possibly never fully decided, as one of the volumes ends with a memorial apparently received by the King as late as in October 1705. By then many of those who had been closely involved, for example Major General Horn, were in Russian captivity.
Разрушения Нотебурга, полученные в ходе осады, и следствие о его капитуляции.
(Я хотел бы поблагодарить Б. Нильссона за разрешение использовать его материалы в своем блоге. Печатный вариант его статьи смотри также в 3 томе материалов конференции «Война и оружие: новые исследования и материалы», прошедшей 16-18 мая в Арт музее в С-Петербурге (ВИМАИВиВС). В его докладе были использованы материалы и иллюстрации, невошедшие в печатный вариант, но приведенные в данном материале).
После капитуляции Густав Вильгельм Шлиппенбах прибыл с остатками гарнизона в Нарву, и практически сразу обратился к нарвскому коменданту г-м Х. Горну с просьбой провести расследование обстоятельств осады и сдачи крепости. Это была первая капитуляция шведской крепости в годы войны, и Шлиппенбах хотел, чтобы следствие подтвердило его честное имя. По его версии, он сделал все, что было в его силах, и капитулировал только тогда, когда исчерпал все силы и средства для обороны крепости. Однако Горн и часть участников обороны считали, что гарнизон еще мог обороняться.   

суббота, 19 мая 2012 г.

Condition of Noteburg fortress by 1700 (from E. Dahlbergh & K.M. Stuart reports)


(I would like to thank B. Nilsson for his kind permission to use his materials. The post is based on his thesis presented at the conference hold in the Artillery Museum in S.Peterburg on 17 May 2012).  
Geometrisch Plaan af Fästningen Nöteborgh Anno 1697
(Swedish Kriegsarkivet)
Swedish Quartermaster General Erik Dahlbergh made in autumn of 1681 an inspection of the Karelia, Ingria & Baltic provinces fortress. He visited Noteborh on 20 October 1702. In his report presented to Carl XI Dahlbergh claimed that Noteborg had not been repaired in the last 30, 40 or more years and was in danger of total collapse. (This statement can however be questioned, as the garrison commander Jacob Sprengtport in the same year presented a detailed list of the repairs made during the previous five years, see Krigsarkivet. Krigskollegiets brevböcker 1681-82, P. 341 ff.). In Dahlbergh’s opinion Nöteborg was a very important position and “the key to the Ladoga”, but the damage caused to walls and towers by rain and water were so great that it would be very expensive and time consuming to bring the fortress into an adequate state. The so called “Svarta Rundeln” (Black Tower) was particularly poor, with major cracks running from the top to the foundation. It was, Dahlbergh concluded, necessary to tear down the tower and rebuild it entirely. (Dahlbergh’s observation is corroborated by a testimony from the summer of 1679, when Johan Staël von Holstein informed the Governor General in Narva that there were five major cracks in the tower, see RA. Livonica II, vol. 360). Another problem was the many wooden buildings inside the fortress as any fire could have devastating consequences.  Something should also be done about a few small islands on the southern side of the fortress, particularly the so called “Kyrkholmen” where according to Dahlbergh siege batteries had been placed during the Swedish-Russian war in the late 16th century.  
Dahlberghs report caused an immediate reaction. Two days after the Quartermaster General had briefed Charles XI, the latter instructed Governor General Schultz in Narva to make sure that “Kyrkholmen” was removed, the moat surrounding the castle cleaned up and stone brought to Nöteborg so that necessary repairs could be carried out.
In 1697 Governor General of Ingria, Field Marshal Otto Wilhelm von Fersen replied on 7 June. As far as Nöteborg was concerned Fersen noted that “Svarta Rundeln” was practically restored to its former strength and height. It was therefore not necessary to do more in that area, but the wall near the garrison commander’s house was in need of repairs and the walls should be given a protective roof, a work von Fersen already had begun.
List of Stuart's report, 10 June 1699
Лист из отчета Стюарта
(kindly provided by B. Nilsson)
In 1699 Carl Magnus Stuart was sent on a tour of the Baltic provinces. He spent 8 days in Nöteborg and made several drawings of the fortress and maps of the surrounding area. He also began the construction of new fortifications. On 10 July he even wrote an instruction for the defense of the fortress, a document of considerable interest as it was later presented during the investigation of the circumstances surrounding the surrender of Noteborg in 1702. Stuart pointed out that no regular siege was possible, so regardless of how the enemy would go about attacking the fortress everything would in the end be decided by the ability of the garrison to withstand a direct assault. The very high walls and towers would make such an attempt difficult. One key point was the gate. Should it be damaged or ruined by artillery fire from the northern shore of the Ladoga this could be countered by filling the entire area with stone and soil, thereby making any entrance impossible. The main danger was instead, Stuart believed, an attempt to force Noteborg to surrender by closing all supply routes. It was consequently imperative to make sure that gunpowder, ammunition, provisions and the garrison itself were protected from enemy bombardment. This could best be done in the newly rebuilt “Svarta Rundeln”, which was constructed to withstand such fire. The bottom floor of other towers could also be used as storage areas if the towers were strengthened by filling one of the floors above with soil and timber and the underlying vaults strengthened by vertical wooden stanchions in great numbers. If everything was done properly Stuart believed Noteborg could hold out for a long time.
Состояние крепости Нотебург к 1700 г. (по отчетам Э. Дальберга и К.М. Стюарта)
(Я хотел бы поблагодарить Б. Нильссона за разрешение использовать его материалы в своем блоге. Печатный вариант его статьи смотри также в 3 томе материалов конференции «Война и оружие: новые исследования и материалы», прошедшей 16-18 мая в Арт музее в С-Петербурге (ВИМАИВиВС). В его докладе были использованы материалы и иллюстрации, невошедшие в печатный вариант, но приведенные в материале ниже. Обратите внимание, что английский и русский варианты поста не совпадают, я не делал дословного перевода, плюс в русском варианте использовал цитаты из статьи Кирпичникова).  
В отношении Нотебурга накануне Великой Северной войны сохранились 2 уникальных шведских документа, описывающих его состояние и анализирующих возможность обороны крепости. Один – инспекционный отчет Э. Дальберга 1681 г. (материалы использованы в статье Кальюнди Е.А., Кирпичников А.Н. в 1975 г.), второй - отчет К. М. Стюарта 1699 г. (материалы приведены в докладе Б. Нильссона на конференции в Арт музее 16-18 мая 2012 г.)

воскресенье, 6 мая 2012 г.

Regimental artillery of the Russian Foot regiments 1701-05


Russian 3-pdr cannon made in 1701 at Moscow Gunnery by L. Zykharev.
Caliber 76 mm, length 142 cm + 8 cm decor at the breech. 
3-фунтовое орудие. Калибр 76 мм, длина ствола 142 см (т.н. «двухаршинные»), «виноград» на задней части ствола — 8 см, бронза. Произведена на московском Пушечном дворе на Неглинке.
Мастер Логин Жихарев, 1701 г.
(Гродненский государственный историко-археологический музей. Белоруссия)

Regimental artillery of the 16 new-raised foot regiments was lost at Narva in November 1700 (see details). It’s re-establishment took time & in 1701-03 number of pieces per regiment was different. In winter campaign of 1701-02 Sheremetev's 7 Foot & 2 Streltzy regiments had 16 cannons. In his next campaign, in July 1702, his 9 Foot & 1 Streltzy regiments had 13 3-pdr cannons. In the next 1703 13 Foot regiments under Sheremetev's command had 23 cannons. Corps of 5 regiments sent to Koporie had only 5 regimental pieces. By 1704 regimental artillery of 2 3-pdr cannons was established in all regiments of the Main army. 
In the second half of 1704 Russians started experiments with increasing of the regimental artillery. 6 Foot (Butyrskiy/Gordon, Repnin, Scharf, Gulitc, I. Rydder, Deydut) regiments of GM A. Scharf brigade sent to Lithuania had 17 pieces in Sept 1704. 5 Foot (Aygustov, Mews, N. Balk, D. Rydder, Kelling) regiments of GM N. von Werden brigade had 2 3-pdr cannons & 1 18-pdr howitzer each. At the same time GM W. von Schweiden brigade  (Angler, Herring, I. Deldin, Lefortowskiy/Schweiden & M. Sheremetiev Foot) brigade had 1 3-pdr cannon per battalion (2 per regiment). 3 Foot (Schonebeck, Lang, Povish) of GM A. Chambers brigade had 2 3-pdr cannons at Gemauerthof in July 1705. In June 1705 3 brigades under gen. Repnin had 2 3-pdr cannons per battalion or 4 per regiment. Finally, the Main Russian army at Hrodno in Oct-Nov 1705 had 80 3-pdr cannons in 48 battalions: 14 regiments (incl. both Guards) had 2 cannons per battalion, 8 – one (see Russian Army at Hrodno January 1706).
All 3-pdr cannons were made at Moscow Gunnery. Cannons produced in 1700-03 weighted about 330 kg & had length 142 cm (plus 8 cm decoration at the breech). Cannons made after 1703 were lighter, about 200-300 kg. Crews were mixed. Artillery (Prikaz/Regiment) provided one cannonier & 1-2 fusilier per cannon, the rest were soldiers. Since 1704 artillerymen were dressed in red or brown European-styled coats with blue collars & cuffs. Lining usually was of uncolored canvas.   
Regiments raised in the provinces (Sevsk, Belgorod) also received regimental pieces. 4 regiments raised in Sevsk in 1703 from Patkul Corps had 2 cannons each (see details). Speshnev Foot from Khowanskiy Corps had 4 3-pdr cannons, Kolpakov Streltzy – 2, Zotov Streltzy – 3 (see details). Foot regiments raised in 1705 from Nepluev Corps had 2 cannons each at the Kletck battle. Provincial troops usually received pre-1700 made cannons of 2-pdr caliber.
Полковая артиллерия русских пехотных полков в 1701-05.
The same cannon. Details of engraving
Детали декора указанной пушки
Полковая артиллерия 16 новых солдатских полков, набранных в 1700, была потеряна в ноябре 1700 под Нарвой (см подробнее), и ее восстановление потребовало около 3 лет. В результате, в период 1701-03 количество полковых орудий в полках было различным.
В зимнем походе 1701-02 в 7 (Лима, Айгустова, Швейдена, Англера, Толбугина, Тыртова, Шарфа) солдатских и 2 (Козодавлева, Вестова) стрелецких полка Большого полка Б.П. Шереметева было дано из Приказа артиллерии 16 орудий, «при той артиллерии господин полковник Гошка, 2 поручика, 2 бомбардира, 19 ч. пушкарей». В июле 1702 при выступлении из Пскова к Дерпту в Большом полку Шереметева насчитывалось «1 мартир, 10 гаубиц, розданы в драгунские полки, 13 пушек 3-х фунтовых, 100 бомб пудовых, к ним по 50 выстрелов … а при той артилерии сухим путем: полковник Яган Гошка, да офицеров - капитан Коберт, порутчиков 3 ч., штык-юнкар 1 ч., капралов 7 ч., лекарь 1 ч., барабанщиков 2 ч., бомбардиров 5 ч., пушкарей 135 ч.». Полковая артиллерия 9 солдатских и одного стрелецкого полков насчитывала всего 13 3-фунтовых орудий. Кроме войск, выступивших сухим путем, еще 6 солдатских и один стрелецкий полк были отправлены с генерал-майором Гулицом «водным путем» через Чудское озеро. Артиллерия этого отряда насчитывала: «6 пушек полковых, к ним по 50 выстрелов». Из остававшихся в Пскове частей Большого полка, 2 полка, Юнгора и Бильса, были 28 августа 1702 отправлены в Ладогу на усиление отряда П.М. Апраксина, с ними были «2 пушки да мартир». В следующем 1703 полковая артиллерия также не имела четкой структуры. В 13 солдатских полках Большого полка, выступивших в конце апреля из Пскова к Ямам, насчитывалось 23 полковых орудия. В отряде Б.П. Шереметева, направленного 8 мая от Шлотбурга к Копорью «солдацкие полки — господин Кар, господин Толбугин, господин Гундертмарк, господин Дейдют, господин Стрекалов с стрелцами, с ними же 5 пушек полковых». Ситуация с количеством полковых орудий стабилизировалась лишь к 1704, когда все полки главной армии получили по 2 новых 3-фунтовых орудия на полк.

суббота, 19 ноября 2011 г.

Swedish garrison of Noteburg, Sept-Oct 1702

I don't find any list of Noteburg garrison during the siege. According to indirect sources it consisted of:
- 150 men from Savolax fordubblings bataljon (were already in garrison by September 1702)
- company (100 men) from Velling infantry regiment under kapt. Freytag von Loringhofen (arrived on 20th of September)
- company (100 men) from Viborgs fordubblings bataljon under kapt. Sass (arrived on 20th of September)
- 50 grenadiers from Nyland infantry regiment (detachment from Leon's forces)
- 30-40 artillerymen 
Geometrisch Plaan af Fästningen Nöteborgh Anno 1697
(Swedish Kriegsarkivet)
Fält Charta eller Thopographisk Delineation öfwer Nötteborgs Situation. 1699
(Swedish Kriegsarkivet)

понедельник, 14 ноября 2011 г.

Taking of Noteburg, 11/22 Oct 1702

Taking of Noteburg by A. Schoonebeck, 1703
Вид осады Нотебурга Адриана Шхонебекаб 1703
Russian losses at the storm on 11 Oct were 564 killed (36 officers & 528 NCOs & soldiers) & 928 wounded (39 officers & 899 soldiers). List of losses includes 10 regiments of 18 presented at Noteburg: Preobrazenskiy, Semenovskiy, Gordon, Gulitc, Bruce, Devgerin, Romanowski, Bukhowen, both Berners.


суббота, 22 октября 2011 г.

Russian army at the siege of Noteburg, Sept 1702


Plan of the siege of Noteburg by A. Schoonebeck, 1703
План осады Нотебурга. Шхонебек Адриан, 1703

Russian army besieged Noteburg consisted of 18 foot regiments numbered 15 854 men. It’s rear was covered by a Corps under P.M. Apraksin of about 8,000 men.
Main army consisted of the following regiment (strength dated 25th of September):  Preobrzensky (2.064), Semenovskiy (1.840), Deydut (993), Gulitc (820), N. v. Werden (816), R. Bruce (673), Devgerin (803), Romanowski (669), v. Bukhowen (809), P. Berner (839), I. Berner (805), M. Treyden (902), Gurik (477), Inglis (561), Gordon/Butyrskiy (454), T. Treyden, Bils (759), Ostrowskiy (722).
In the beginning of October two more regiments (Yungor & Cooper/Abram) joined main army. They totaled ab. 1.000-1.200 men.
Apraxsin’s Corps: ab. 500 of Moscow feudal levy, ab. 3,200 of Novgorod Feudal levy (about half of them are without horses), A. Mullin Dragoons (ab. 1,000), ab. 3.000 of Cossacks under E. Petrov, M. Baishev Foot (Streltcy, 651),

Русская армия при осаде Нотебурга, 25 сентября 1702
Войска для осады Нотебурга были собраны в лагере на реке Назье 25 сентября. Основу осадной армии составили полки генеральства Репнина, переброшенные из Новгорода (10 полков, включая отправленный в начале лета к Апраксину Бутырский полк), и отряда ладожского воеводы П.М. Апраксина (из 9 полков в операциях против Нотебурга приняли участие 5, кроме этого полк Купера-Абрама присоединился в начале октября). Также из Большого полка Шереметева были присланы 3 (четвертый Юнгора пришел в октябре) полка,