Bengt Nilsson kindly permits me to put in my blog his material from the last historical conference in Artillery Museum (S. Peterburg): Nilsson B. Abraham Cronhjort and the defense of Ingria 1700-1703// Война и оружие: Новые исследования и материалы. Труды Четвертой Международной научно-практической конференции, 15-17 мая 2013 года. Ч. 3. СПб.: ВИМАИВиВС, 2013. с. 329-340.
On 11 February 1700 Saxon forces crossed the Swedish border in an attempt to take Riga by surprise. The next day Governor General Erik Dahlbergh sent Captain Johan Brask of the Nyland Infantry Regiment to Stockholm with the instruction to give Charles XII a full report of the events.[i] As the news spread across the Baltic provinces the Swedish army started to mobilize. The Estonian Governor General Axel Julius de la Gardie sent his own courier to Stockholm on 19 February, suggesting that the Finnish regiment should be given orders to march on Livonia. Considering the difficulties of getting letters across the Baltic Sea during the winter de la Gardie took the liberty of sending a similar request directly to the Finnish County Governors and regimental commanders. De la Gardies courier Captain Otto Magnus Wolffelt carried these letters through Estonia, Ingria and southern Finland, probably reaching Sweden by route of the Åland Islands. Wolffelt reached Charles XII at the very latest on 7 March, when Captain Brask (who had taken the route around the Gulf of Bothnia) had not yet arrived. The King immediately ordered a full mobilization of the Finnish regiments, but this had already started when the news from Riga reached Finland.[ii]
The regular Finnish forces were not very large. In each of the six southern counties there was one infantry regiment: Åbo (1,025 men), Björneborg (1,025), Tavastehus (1,025), Viborg (1,000), Savolax (1,033) and Nyland (1,025). There were also three cavalry regiments: Åbo and Björneborg (1,000), Nyland and Tavastehus (1,000) and Karelska (1,000), as well as a small unit of dragoons (500). To these can be added the Österbotten Infantry Regiment (1,200) and the Finnish companies of Adelsfanan.[iii] However, not all of these units were available. The Österbotten infantry was tied to garrison duty in Riga and in some other Livonian fortresses and the same was true for at least a couple of companies from the Åbo and the Nyland infantry regiments. Probably not much more that 9 000 men could consequently be counted on for the formation of a field army.[iv] No reinforcements from Sweden could be expected in the foreseeable future, considering the season and the tension with Denmark.
The next problem was that the full mobilization of the Finnish regiments for the relief of Riga would leave Finland without a defense. What would then happen if the disturbing rumors from Russia were true? It was clear to both Charles XII and the Finnish county governors that additional forces would have to be found in one way or another.
On 7 April 1700 Charles XII established Defensionskommissionen, a committee consisting of 8 Councilors of the Realm. They were given the task of finding means to replace the departing Swedish and Finnish regiments. The King at first suggested that conscription could be a solution, but this was problematic since the creation of the standing army was based on an agreement between the King and the peasants in which the latter were promised freedom from conscription if they agreed to set up standing regiments. Eventually it was decided to base the recruitment of new units upon the existing system of rotar and rusthåll. One rote (which recruited one soldier to a standing infantry regiment) or one rusthåll would join together with two others and set up an additional soldier (tremänning). Each county would in this way for every 1 000 soldiers in the standing infantry or cavalry regiments produce 333 tremänningar, which subsequently could be united with two or three similar units from bordering counties and reach battalion or even regimental strength.[v]
This system was established throughout Finland and Sweden during the coming weeks and months, but new complications started to develop during the summer. The Governor of Ingria Otto Vellingk, who in April had been appointed commander of the relief army, came in late July to the conclusion that he needed more reinforcements from Finland to stop the Saxon advance. At the same time appeals for help started to come from Narva, where worrying rumors about Russian preparations near Novgorod and Pskov were spreading. On10 August 1700 County Governor Anders Lindehielm in Viborg informed Defensionskommissionen that he was inclined towards replacing the previous system of tremänningar with a general doubling of the standing units, i.e. the three rotar or rusthall would have to produce three extra soldiers instead of one. Similar suggestions later arrived from the County Governors Abraham Cronhjort in Helsinki and Jakob Bure in Turku.[vi]
These proposals were initially rebuffed by both the committee and the King. The committee feared that a doubling would make it increasingly difficult to replace losses in the standing regiments and result in abandoned farms. It was, the committee suggested, even doubtful that the new soldiers could be equipped properly. The King declared that he did not believe that enough suitable men could be found and that it under the present circumstances was quite impossible to find equipment. On 7 September Charles XII consequently ordered Lindehielm, Bure and Cronhjort to stop additional recruitment beyond the tremänningar. However, as the three county governors continued to point to the increasingly bad news from Livonia and Russia Charles XII changed his mind and on the 20 September informed them that they could proceed with the “doubling”.[vii] Lindehielm, Bure and Cronhjort were also ordered to send the new units by sea to Livonia as soon as possible. Eventually this proved impossible to achieve as winter approached. On 11 October, a few days after arriving in Reval, the King instructed Abraham Cronhjort to take command of the remaining forces in his, Bure’s and Lindehielm’s counties and be prepared to march when orders arrived. This order was repeated three weeks later and on 3 November 1700 Abraham Cronhjort was appointed Major General.[viii]
After Narva : December 1700-January 1701
The appointment of Abraham Cronhjort (1633-1703) was, in light of the circumstances, very logical. After the march to Livonia by the regular Finnish regiments in the spring of 1700 and the appointment of Otto Vellingk as commander of the relief force, there was simply no other suitable alternative. The other Finnish county governors were all civilians and Cronhjort had, despite his age, proved vigorous and decisive during the recruitment of new units for the defense of Finland. His military experience was second to none, dating back to 1648 when he had taken part in the raid on Prague. During the Scanian War in the 1670’s Cronhjort had served with distinction and later been Colonel of the Kronoberg Infantry Regiment for nearly 20 years.[ix] But what role would he and his army be given – offensive or defensive?
Under the impression of the victory at Narva some pushed hard for an invasion of Russia. Governor General Otto Vellingk on 25 November presented a plan for the invasion of Russia on two fronts. The King’s army would march through Ingria towards Novgorod, while forces in Livonia attacked Pskov. Vellingk also promoted the idea of publishing letters of protection in Russian to convince the population on the other side of the border to deliver supplies. This was, he later wrote, in the beginning quite successful.[x]
In the evening of 10 December Cronhiort passed through Viborg on his journey to the army, which under the command of Colonel Johan Apolloff had started to concentrate at Duderhof (Можа́йский).[xi] On the 14th Cronhiort reported to the King that he some of his units would need another two weeks to arrive, but he was the following day going to march on Loppis (Путилово). Cronhjort would then, in response to the King’s letter of protection for the inhabitants of Russia of 3 December, proceed into Russia and request contributions from the inhabitants of the towns and villages.[xii] The following day Cronhjort wrote to Charles XII from Nyen, reporting that his force now consisted of about 3 500 men and would in the near future rise to about 6 000. The soldiers were all, Cronhjort wrote, well equipped and ready to show their devotion to the King. This force would not only protect Ingria, but also be able to carry out offensive operations. Cronhjort added that he had already sent 600 men to the eastern border, where they would protect the province from Russian marauders and convince the inhabitants of Ingria to return to their homes. [xiii]
On the 16th Cronhjort again wrote to Charles, reporting that 200 men had been sent to the border near Salmis (Салми), while about 1 800 were stationed near Loppis and another 1 600 at Orlina (Орлино). Everything appeared ready for a march into Russia, but Cronhjort was hesitant. The troops had very little ammunition and a sudden Russian attack on one of the detachments could prove dangerous. Perhaps the King preferred a more concentrated approach? Properly provisioned and equipped Cronhjort could then proceed to towns like Ladoga, Tikhvin, Olonets or even Novgorod and attack everyone who would not submit. This bold suggestion was duly noted by Charles and would later come back to haunt Cronhjort.
On the 19th the King sent firm orders. After sending 500 men to reinforce the garrison at Narva and 30 to garrison the fortress Koporie, Cronhjort should lead his army across the border in one or two convenient places. His main task was to demand contributions, but if the Russians refused Cronhjort should burn and destroy as far as possible.
On the 24th Cronhjort wrote again, this time from Petrofzina village (Петровщина), not far from Loppis. The King’s protection letter (in Russian and Swedish) had been sent across the border, but so far the only response was that the inhabitants were going to forward the letter to the Czar so he could decide. A Russian raiding party had encountered Cronhjort’s advance guard. One Russian boyar and 11 soldiers had been killed, Cronhjort stated, and the rest had fled. Swedish scouts who had crossed the border reported that no Russians could be found for more than 20 km.
During the days just before Christmas 1700 Charles XII seems to have changed his mind. The Swedish detachments which crossed the border would no longer have the gathering of supplies as their main task. On 22 December Charles repeated his attack order from three days before, but Cronhjort was now instructed to “burn and devastate everything” and then retreat. On the 25th Magnus Stenbock was ordered to take Gdov and burn certain estates belonging to some local boyars, who had not respected the letters of protection and carried out a raid on Vasknarva (Сыренец,).[xiv]
It would seem that Charles after a few days changed his mind again. On the 28th the King again wrote to Cronhjort, emphasizing the payment of contributions either “voluntarily or by force”. The main thing now seemed to be finding supplies for the army, not the destruction of enemy property. [xv]
In early 1701 Cronhjort marched into Russia and reached the village of Saari (Шум), where according to his information six boyars lived. Contrary to rumor no Russian force could be found. The Swedes captured some peasants and a priest, who was released and sent further into Russia with the King’s letter of protection. The prisoners said that the protection letter was well known, but nobody dared to trust it. To prove that the promises were reliable and to encourage the population Cronhjort retreated from Saari back to Loppis. His intention was to proceed along the border, forcing unwilling Russians to give contributions. He had also encouraged peasants from Noteborg County to collect forage and unthreshed grain from the border area.
In mid-January Cronhjort again crossed into Russia, establishing his headquarters at Vasilkovo. In his letters to the King he continued to report that the Russians were unwilling to give contributions. He also pointed out his shortage of artillery and ammunition, but on the 17th he was ready to again advance to Saari.
The siege of Saari
From Cronhjort’s own reports it’s possible to piece together what happened at Saari. It would seem that he fairly easily managed to cross the river at which point the opposing Russian cavalry retreated and the infantry took cover in a fortified wooden manor. Due to its position and the strong defenses Cronhjort was unable to use his cavalry, so he first tried to persuade the Russians to surrender. When this failed he attempted to set fire to the houses, but his untrained soldiers were hesitant in the face of heavy defensive fire. On the 21st Cronhjort made a new attempt to attack, but again without success. He then prepared 3 sledges with flammable material, which in the morning of the 23rd were pushed towards the manor. It was twice set on fire, but the Russians countered by pouring out water through the roof and even managed to push one of the sledges away. The deep snow made it difficult for the Swedish infantry to come up in support fast enough. After having 81 men killed or wounded Cronhjort appealed to the King for some mortars, but also made it clear that he had prepared a new round of incendiary devices which he believed would be successful. The Major General also reported that according to some prisoners taken during an expedition towards Ladoga a relief force was gathering at Novgorod. The prisoners did not know who was commanding the defenders at Saari, but Cronhjort was sure that it must be a Pole or Saxon as he had proved to be very cunning.
On the 26th the mortars finally arrived, but before these could prove decisive the Russian defenders managed to sneak out and disappear under cover of darkness. In his report to Charles on the 29th Cronhjort tried to show that the manor had been almost impossible to take without a large loss of life, but he promised a full inquest into the circumstances surrounding the defenders successful escape. He also reported that according to rumor the Czar had gone to Moscow to prepare the dispatch of a peace delegation.[xvi]
The events at Saari were undoubtedly most embarrassing to Cronhjort and Charles XII made this clear in a letter dated 1 February. At that time the King did not yet know how the siege had ended, but he pointed out that Cronhjort just before Christmas had implied that he would be capable to march as far as Novgorod and force large areas to give contributions. In light of this – how could Cronhjort find it so difficult to capture a “poor wooden manor”?[xvii]
On 1 February Cronhjort again reported to Charles, saying that he had taken 2 000 cavalry and dragoons on an expedition further into Russia burning houses and manors and then retreating back to Loppis. He also stated that some on the Russian side of the Järvisaari (Ярвосоль) and Lissila (Ли́сино) border had been prepared to give contributions, but some peasants from Ingria had attacked them. To stop further actions like this Cronhjort had sent 300 cavalry and dragoons to keep order. [xviii]
On 4 February Cronhjort returned to the subject. In view of the fact that the peasant’s actions had resulted in Russian reprisals, he had forbidden further such excursions and was inclined to punish the culprits. In his reply a few days later Charles XII strongly disagreed. He saw no reason why the peasants should be punished and instructed Cronhjort to let them burn as much as they wished. Shortly thereafter Cronhjort abandoned the campaign and let his troops go into winter quarters. [xix]
On the defensive
In late May 1701 Charles XII granted Cronhjort full powers on the Ingrian theatre of war, i.e. he could handle the defense as he saw fit and would answer to the King only.[xx] Charles had already made it clear to both Apolloff in Nyen and Schlippenbach in Noteborg that they were under the command of Cronhjort, regardless of Major General Horn’s appointment as supreme commander of the fortresses in Ingria. As the Royal Army started marching southwards, eventually crossing the Daugava and occupying Courland, the King’s knowledge of the situation in Ingria diminished and he became increasingly reluctant to give firm orders. In an instruction dated 4 June Charles emphasized the importance of protecting the fortresses, particularly Nyen and Noteborg, but left the conduct of operations to Cronhjort. When the latter on 5 June asked for specific instructions on how to conduct operations Charles simply replied that he had already been given a free hand and should act accordingly. On 16 June Charles wrote Cronhjort, telling him to make a diversion into Russia – one of the last times the Major General was given specific orders on how to proceed.[xxi] When the King’s own army was given top priority and the Courland-Lithuanian area increased in importance as Charles got more and more involved with Augustus II’s Polish and Lithuanian opponents, the Russian forays into Livonia placed Schlippenbach’s army next on the list. The Ingrian theatre of war was not forgotten, but it was firmly in the shadow of events elsewhere.
Cronhjort’s position as supreme commander in Ingria, answerable only to the King made opposition to his orders very difficult. In May 1701 Cronhjort ordered Schlippenbach at Noteborg to equip a few small boats and send them on reconnaissance missions. The garrison commander’s was opposed to this and asked Major General Horn for advice. Horn told Schlippenbach that he had every right to refuse to carry out such orders if he considered them harmful to the defense of the fortress. Cronhjort reacted furiously, telling Schlippenbach in no uncertain terms that the King had given him supreme authority over both the army and the garrisons at Nyen and Noteborg.[xxii] In July Horn objected to Cronhjort’s handling of the defense, suggesting that it would be better to keep most of the army stationed on the southern border of Ingria and strong detachments at the furthest eastern and western points. If this was combined with small posts placed at intervals of 10 km Cronhjort would, Horn claimed, in six hours know of any Russian foray into Ingria. Horn even tried to enlist Governor General Dahlbergh in Riga in an effort to persuade the King to intervene, but to no avail.[xxiii] In the autumn of 1701 complaints against Cronhjort reached Defensionskommissionen. He had, they were told, allowed many officers and soldiers to leave the army at Loppis and go home, putting Ingria at risk. The Committee tried to intervene, but were basically told by Cronhjort that it was none of their business as he had been appointed by the King and answered to nobody but him. The Committee had however taken certain precautions by informing Charles XII and he fully supported their action.[xxiv]
Prelude to Noteborg
In early July 1702 Cronhjort made a foray into Russia, but was forced back by heavy rain. He then went back to Nyen, where he mostly had his headquarters during this period. In late July new reports claimed that a large Russian force was gathering in the east and the Swedish outposts near Loppis were forced back. The area, which already had suffered badly during a previous expedition, was again devastated. The Russians pressed on towards Ingris (Ижора), where they on 14 August were attacked by Cronhjort’s cavalry. Despite some success Cronhjort considered it impossible to remain at Ingris and soon retreated.[xxv] On 26 August he wrote to Governor General Frölich in Riga, expressing pessimism in regard to his ability to protect Ingria against further attacks by overwhelming enemy forces. About two weeks later he sounded more optimistic, telling Defensionskommissionen that the Russians suddenly had withdrawn from their camp at Ingris. Cronhjort claimed that he had intended to pursue the retreating Russians, but that severe rains made this impossible. At this point he even seemed inclined to believe that nothing more would happen before winter arrived.[xxvi]
However, in mid-September worrying news arrived. Russian parties had observed near Noteborg and on the 12th a large force had been seen marching past the fortress.[xxvii] At this time Cronhjort was preparing to let his army go into winter quarters. Towards the end of September large Russian forces began to assemble near Noteborg. This was the first time that any of the key positions in Ingria was under serious attack. How would Cronhjort respond?
Cronhjort and the siege of Nöteborg
Cronhjort was quickly informed about the attack on Nöteborg. In a letter to Defensionskommissionen on 2 October he reported that he had immediately sent a major, some officers and as many soldiers as he could, along with medical supplies. Much more could, he feared, not be done as his army was weak and poorly equipped. Four days later Cronhjort reported more Russian advances into Ingria and that Schlippenbach at Nöteborg had informed him that the besiegers seemed to prepare a descent on the northern shore of the Ladoga. This had caused Cronhjort to dispatch 300 men with 4 guns, but this force had arrived too late to stop the crossing and was defeated. Cronhjort stated that he had given up the defense of the southern shore of the Neva and was concentrating on holding his ground on the northern. At his disposal he had only 4 000 soldiers, poorly fed and poorly equipped. The Carelian peasants had abandoned their posts, so there was no help to be found anywhere.[xxviii]
The Nyen disaster
After the fall of Nöteborg on 13 October there was considerable nervousness on the Swedish side. When some Kalmyks a week later appeared near Nyen panic broke out. The Swedish outposts fled towards the town, which caused Cronhjort to withdraw northwards. At this point the garrison commander Johan Apolloff set the town on fire, believing that an attack on the fortress was imminent. In the process large supplies were destroyed – and no attack on the fortress materialized.[xxix] While the fall of Nöteborg severely hurt Cronhjort’s reputation, this proved to be a fatal blow. Major General Horn in Narva had long been a critic of his dispositions, the former commander of Nöteborg G. W. Schlippenbach resented the lack of assistance from the army during the siege, Apolloff wanted to absolve himself from blame for the destruction of Nyen and the commander of the Ladoga squadron Vice Admiral Numers was unhappy with the lack of support given by Cronhjort during the campaigns of 1701 and 1702. Horn also forwarded complaints from civilian authorities in Ingria, who were unhappy with how the army had treated the peasants. The County Governor Lindehielm in Viborg added to this chorus of criticism.[xxx] The matter clearly was something Defensionskommissionen could not wave aside. Something must be done – but what? Cronhjort had been appointed by Charles XII and was responsible only to him. Could the government in Stockholm remove Cronhjort without consulting the King?
The effort to have Cronhjort removed
On 5 November Defensionskommissionen met to discuss the latest news from Ingria. Reports the events at Nyen had reached Stockholm and the committee members were upset. They agreed that a sharply worded rebuke should be sent to Cronhjort, but the Governor of Stockholm, Lieutenant General Kristofer Gyllenstierna was not satisfied. Somebody should be sent over to assist Cronhjort, who was and old man and not as vigorous as he once was. If this person was put in charge of the peasants, he could help Cronhjort mount a stronger defense. This solution would mean no infringement on the latter’s authority, as he was only in charge of the army. However, soon new letters were brought in. Lindehielm reported about a lack of discipline in Cronhjort’s army and suggested that somebody be sent to assist Cronhjort along with 4-5 000 in reinforcements. At this point the powerful Count Fabian Wrede suggested that Cronhjort was too old and frail to command the necessary authority. The complaints from Horn, Lindehielm, Apolloff and others, especially in regard to the lack of discipline, could not be disregarded. The discussion turned serious. Surely the King would best be served if Cronhjort was replaced by someone else and allowed to go back to his post as County Governor? If the Major General was told that his presence was needed back in Helsinki it could perhaps help ease the blow? The matter was very delicate and the change, it was decided, could not be made by the Committee. The Council of Realm must be consulted, as they had the authority to step in when something was so urgent that it was impossible to wait for the King’s decision. Johan Gabriel Stenbock noted that a decision would need to be made quickly and whoever was appointed as a replacement must also be given the necessary resources.[xxxi]
Apparently even the Council considered the matter too hot to handle, so on 28 November the issue was back in Defensionskommissionen. In light of so many complaints the Committee decided to write Charles XII and tell him that the situation called for replacing the aging Cronhjort. This letter, dated Stockholm 15 December 1702, seems to have reached the King as late as March 1703.[xxxii] On 5 April Charles reacted, appointing Major General Georg Johan Maydell (Commander of the Tavastehus infantry regiment) as Cronhjort’s replacement. Maydell was also promoted to Lieutenant General. The same day Charles XII wrote to Cronhjort, informing him that he was needed in Helsinki and should return to his position as County Governor as soon as Maydell arrived.[xxxiii] After having survived various complaints over the course of two years the end had come for the old Major General. The news reached him at the beginning of May and he reacted with considerable bitterness, suggesting that devious intrigues behind his back finally had been successful. Cronhjort asked for an investigation, which he believed would show his innocence.[xxxiv] After having turned over the army to Maydell at the beginning of September 1703, Cronhjort returned to Helsinki. There he died 2 months later, without having had the opportunity to present his case to the authorities in Stockholm.
[i] Latvijas Valsts vēstures arhīvs (LVVA), Fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 72, Erik Dahlbergh to Charles XII 12 February 1700.
[ii] For the details, see Viljanti, A., Suomen rykmenttien liikekannallo ja marssi Liivinmaale v. 1700 // Historiallinen Arkisto. 45. 1939. P. 303-355.
[iii] For the numbers, see Nordensvan, C. O., Svenska armén åren 1700-1709 // Karolinska Förbundets Årsbok. 1916. P. 120-180
[iv] It’s also the figure given by Cronhjort, see Krigsarkivet (KrA),Krigskollegium, Krigskollegii kansli E c: 64, Cronhjort to Krigskollegium 16 August 1700.
[v] The discussions have been analyzed in Persson, R., Rustningarna i Sverige under det stora nordiska kriget. Lund, 1973.
[vi] Ibid., pp 47-52.
[vii] Ibid, p. 50.
[viii] Riksarkivet (RA), Riksregistraturet, Charles XII to Cronhjort 3 November 1700
[ix] KrA, Biografica, Cronhjort; Lewenhaupt, A., Karl XII:s officerare. Vol. 1. Stockholm, 1920. P. 126
[x] DelaGardiska archivet. Vol.13. Lund, 1840. P. 187-191, Letter from Otto Vellingk to Fabian Wrede 2 January 1701.
[xi] RA, ÄK 243, vol. 77, Anders Lindehielm to Defensionskommissionen 12 December 1700.
[xii] RA, Skrivelser till Konungen, ser. 1, vol. 5, Cronhjort to Charles XII 14 December 1700. For the letter of protection, see Riksregistraturet 3 December 1700.
[xiii] RA, Skrivelser till Konungen, ser. 1, vol. 5, Cronhjort to Charles XII 15 December 1700.
[xiv] The King’s orders in RA, Riksregistraturet. For Cronhjort’s reports to Charles, see RA, Skrivelser till Konungen. Ser 1. Vol. 5.
[xv] RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles XII to Cronhjort 28 December 1700.
[xvi] For the events at Saari, see RA, Skrivelser till Konungen. Ser. 1, Vol. 5, Cronhjort to Charles XII 24 and 29 January; RA, ÄK 243, A. Lindehielm to Defensionskommissionen 20, 23, 27, 29 January and 2 February 1702.
[xvii] RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles XII to Cronhjort 1 February 1701.
[xviii] RA, Skrivelser till Konungen. Ser. 1, Vol. 5, Cronhjort to Charles XII 1 February 1701.
[xix] For a general description of the campaign in Ingria during early 1701, see also Rosen, C. von, Bidrag till kännedom om de händelser… Vol. 2:2. Stockholm, 1936. P. 7-10.
[xx] RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles XII to Cronhjort 27 May 1701.
[xxi] Ibid, Charles XII to Cronhjort 16 June 1701
[xxii] RA. M 1376. Sub A. (Documents concerning the defense of Nöteborg).
[xxiii] LVVA, Fond 7349, op. 1. Vol. 276, H. R. Horn to Erik Dahlbergh 7 July 1701.The same complaint apparently reached Stockholm, see Åkerhielm, S., Samuel Agriconius Åkerhielms brev till Josias Cederhielm och Mauritz Vellingk 1700-1702. Stockholm, 1979. P. 64-65, Samuel Åkerhielm to Josias Cederhielm 23 July 1701.
[xxiv] RA, ÄK 243, vol. 86, Cronhjort to Defensionskommissionen 9 October 1701; RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles XII to Cronhjort 18 October 1701.
[xxv] LVVA, Fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 311, Cronhjort to K. G. Frölich 26 August 1702 (with a separate description of events during August).
[xxvi] RA, ÄK 243, vol. 94, Cronhjort to Defensionskommissionen 7 September 1702.
[xxvii] Ibid., H. R. Horn to Defensionskommissionen 17 September 1702.
[xxviii] Ibid., Cronhjort to Defensionskommissionen 6 October 1702
[xxix] Ibid, Cronhjort to Defensionskommissionen 21 and 28 October 1702 (with testimony from Lieutenant Colonels H. O. Brakel, B. W. Rehbinder, C. von Hagen and Major R. J. de la Barre); J. Apolloff to Defensionskommissionen 22 and 30 October (with testimony from Lieutenant Colonel H. Köhler and Captain A. G. Zweibergk)
[xxx] Ibid., H. R. Horn to Defensionskommissionen 6 September (with copy of letter from bailiff Björn Finne) 31 October (with copies of several letters from Apolloff to Horn) and 3 November 1702; RA, ÄK 243, vol. 91, A. Lindehielm to Defensionskommissionen 24 and 28 October 1702 (with copy of a letter from Apolloff dated 25 October). See also note 32.
[xxxi] RA, ÄK 243, vol. 1.
[xxxii] Historiska handlingar. Vol. 2. Stockholm, 1862. P. 261-268
[xxxiii] RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles XII to G. J. Maydell and A. Cronhjort 5 April 1703. The King had in fact already in late 1702, upon receiving news of Nöteborg’s surrender, expressed dissatisfaction with Cronhjort, see DelaGardiska archivet. Vol.13. Lund, 1840. P. 164-165, Excerpt from letter from Axel Sparre to Fabian Wrede 3 December 1702. Sparre mentions severe complaints already in 1701, but states that certain people had supported Cronhjort.
[xxxiv] RA, ÄK 243, vol. 107, Cronhjort to Defensionskommissionen 8 May 1703.