Bengt Nilsson kindly permits me to put in my blog his material from the
last historical conference in Artillery Museum (S. Peterburg): Nilsson B. Abraham
Cronhjort and the defense of Ingria 1700-1703// Война и оружие: Новые исследования и материалы. Труды Четвертой Международной научно-практической
конференции, 15-17 мая 2013 года. Ч. 3. СПб.: ВИМАИВиВС, 2013. с. 329-340.
On 11 February 1700 Saxon
forces crossed the Swedish border in an attempt to take Riga by surprise. The
next day Governor General Erik Dahlbergh sent Captain Johan Brask of the Nyland
Infantry Regiment to Stockholm with the instruction to give Charles XII a full
report of the events.[i]
As the news spread across the Baltic provinces the Swedish army started to
mobilize. The Estonian Governor General Axel Julius de la Gardie sent his own
courier to Stockholm on 19 February, suggesting that the Finnish regiment
should be given orders to march on Livonia. Considering the difficulties of
getting letters across the Baltic Sea during the winter de la Gardie took the
liberty of sending a similar request directly to the Finnish County Governors
and regimental commanders. De la Gardies courier Captain Otto Magnus Wolffelt
carried these letters through Estonia, Ingria and southern Finland, probably
reaching Sweden by route of the Åland Islands. Wolffelt reached Charles XII at
the very latest on 7 March, when Captain Brask (who had taken the route around
the Gulf of Bothnia) had not yet arrived. The King immediately ordered a full
mobilization of the Finnish regiments, but this had already started when the
news from Riga reached Finland.[ii]
The regular Finnish forces
were not very large. In each of the six southern counties there was one
infantry regiment: Åbo (1,025 men), Björneborg (1,025), Tavastehus (1,025), Viborg
(1,000), Savolax (1,033) and Nyland (1,025). There were also three
cavalry regiments: Åbo and Björneborg (1,000),
Nyland and Tavastehus (1,000) and Karelska (1,000), as well as a small
unit of dragoons (500). To these can be added the Österbotten Infantry Regiment (1,200) and the Finnish companies of Adelsfanan.[iii]
However, not all of these units were available. The Österbotten infantry was
tied to garrison duty in Riga and in some other Livonian fortresses and the
same was true for at least a couple of companies from the Åbo and the Nyland infantry
regiments. Probably not much more that 9 000 men could consequently be
counted on for the formation of a field army.[iv]
No reinforcements from Sweden could be
expected in the foreseeable future, considering the season and the tension with
Denmark.
The next problem was that
the full mobilization of the Finnish regiments for the relief of Riga would
leave Finland without a defense. What would then happen if the disturbing
rumors from Russia were true? It was clear to both Charles XII and the Finnish
county governors that additional forces would have to be found in one way or
another.
On 7 April 1700 Charles XII
established Defensionskommissionen, a
committee consisting of 8 Councilors of the Realm. They were given the task of
finding means to replace the departing Swedish and Finnish regiments. The King
at first suggested that conscription could be a solution, but this was
problematic since the creation of the standing army was based on an agreement
between the King and the peasants in which the latter were promised freedom
from conscription if they agreed to set up standing regiments. Eventually it
was decided to base the recruitment of new units upon the existing system of rotar and rusthåll. One rote (which
recruited one soldier to a standing infantry regiment) or one rusthåll would join together with two
others and set up an additional soldier (tremänning).
Each county would in this way for every 1 000 soldiers in the standing
infantry or cavalry regiments produce 333 tremänningar,
which subsequently could be united with two or three similar units from
bordering counties and reach battalion or even regimental strength.[v]
This system was established
throughout Finland and Sweden during the coming weeks and months, but new
complications started to develop during the summer. The Governor of Ingria Otto
Vellingk, who in April had been appointed commander of the relief army, came in
late July to the conclusion that he needed more reinforcements from Finland to stop
the Saxon advance. At the same time appeals for help started to come from
Narva, where worrying rumors about Russian preparations near Novgorod and Pskov
were spreading. On10 August 1700 County Governor Anders Lindehielm in Viborg
informed Defensionskommissionen that
he was inclined towards replacing the previous system of tremänningar with a general doubling of the standing units, i.e.
the three rotar or rusthall would have to produce three extra
soldiers instead of one. Similar suggestions later arrived from the County
Governors Abraham Cronhjort in Helsinki and Jakob Bure in Turku.[vi]
These proposals were
initially rebuffed by both the committee and the King. The committee feared
that a doubling would make it increasingly difficult to replace losses in the
standing regiments and result in abandoned farms. It was, the committee
suggested, even doubtful that the new soldiers could be equipped properly. The
King declared that he did not believe that enough suitable men could be found
and that it under the present circumstances was quite impossible to find
equipment. On 7 September Charles XII
consequently ordered Lindehielm, Bure and Cronhjort to stop additional
recruitment beyond the tremänningar. However, as the three county governors
continued to point to the increasingly bad news from Livonia and Russia Charles
XII changed his mind and on the 20 September informed them that they could
proceed with the “doubling”.[vii]
Lindehielm, Bure and Cronhjort were also ordered to send the new units by sea
to Livonia as soon as possible.
Eventually this proved impossible to achieve as winter approached. On 11 October, a few days after arriving in
Reval, the King instructed Abraham Cronhjort to take command of the remaining
forces in his, Bure’s and Lindehielm’s counties and be prepared to march when
orders arrived. This order was repeated three weeks later and on 3 November
1700 Abraham Cronhjort was appointed Major General.[viii]
After Narva : December 1700-January 1701
The appointment of Abraham
Cronhjort (1633-1703) was, in light of the circumstances, very logical. After
the march to Livonia by the regular Finnish regiments in the spring of 1700 and
the appointment of Otto Vellingk as commander of the relief force, there was
simply no other suitable alternative. The other Finnish county governors were
all civilians and Cronhjort had, despite his age, proved vigorous and decisive
during the recruitment of new units for the defense of Finland. His military
experience was second to none, dating back to 1648 when he had taken part in
the raid on Prague. During the Scanian War in the 1670’s Cronhjort had served
with distinction and later been Colonel of the Kronoberg Infantry Regiment for
nearly 20 years.[ix]
But what role would he and his army be given – offensive or defensive?
Under the impression of the victory
at Narva some pushed hard for an invasion of Russia. Governor General Otto
Vellingk on 25 November presented a plan for the invasion of Russia on two
fronts. The King’s army would march through Ingria towards Novgorod, while
forces in Livonia attacked Pskov. Vellingk also promoted the idea of publishing
letters of protection in Russian to convince the population on the other side
of the border to deliver supplies. This was, he later wrote, in the beginning
quite successful.[x]
In the evening of 10 December
Cronhiort passed through Viborg on his journey to the army, which under the
command of Colonel Johan Apolloff had started to concentrate at Duderhof
(Можа́йский).[xi]
On the 14th Cronhiort reported to the King that he some of his units
would need another two weeks to arrive, but he was the following day going to
march on Loppis (Путилово). Cronhjort would then, in response to the King’s letter
of protection for the inhabitants of Russia of 3 December, proceed into Russia
and request contributions from the inhabitants of the towns and villages.[xii] The following day Cronhjort wrote to Charles
XII from Nyen, reporting that his force now consisted of about 3 500 men
and would in the near future rise to about 6 000. The soldiers were all,
Cronhjort wrote, well equipped and ready to show their devotion to the King.
This force would not only protect Ingria, but also be able to carry out
offensive operations. Cronhjort added that he had already sent 600 men to the
eastern border, where they would protect the province from Russian marauders
and convince the inhabitants of Ingria to return to their homes. [xiii]
On the 16th
Cronhjort again wrote to Charles, reporting that 200 men had been sent to the
border near Salmis (Салми), while about 1 800 were stationed near Loppis
and another 1 600 at Orlina (Орлино). Everything appeared ready for a
march into Russia, but Cronhjort was hesitant. The troops had very little
ammunition and a sudden Russian attack on one of the detachments could prove
dangerous. Perhaps the King preferred a more concentrated approach? Properly
provisioned and equipped Cronhjort could then proceed to towns like Ladoga, Tikhvin,
Olonets or even Novgorod and attack everyone who would not submit. This bold suggestion was duly noted by Charles
and would later come back to haunt Cronhjort.
On the 19th the
King sent firm orders. After sending 500 men to reinforce the garrison at Narva
and 30 to garrison the fortress Koporie, Cronhjort should lead his army across
the border in one or two convenient places. His main task was to demand
contributions, but if the Russians refused Cronhjort should burn and destroy as
far as possible.
On the 24th Cronhjort
wrote again, this time from Petrofzina village (Петровщина), not far from
Loppis. The King’s protection letter (in Russian and Swedish) had been sent
across the border, but so far the only response was that the inhabitants were
going to forward the letter to the Czar so he could decide. A Russian raiding
party had encountered Cronhjort’s advance guard. One Russian boyar and 11
soldiers had been killed, Cronhjort stated, and the rest had fled. Swedish scouts who had crossed the border
reported that no Russians could be found for more than 20 km.
During the days just before
Christmas 1700 Charles XII seems to have changed his mind. The Swedish
detachments which crossed the border would no longer have the gathering of
supplies as their main task. On 22
December Charles repeated his attack order from three days before, but
Cronhjort was now instructed to “burn and devastate everything” and then
retreat. On the 25th Magnus Stenbock was ordered to take Gdov and
burn certain estates belonging to some local boyars, who had not respected the
letters of protection and carried out a raid on Vasknarva (Сыренец,).[xiv]
It would seem that Charles
after a few days changed his mind again. On the 28th the King again
wrote to Cronhjort, emphasizing the payment of contributions either
“voluntarily or by force”. The main thing now seemed to be finding supplies for
the army, not the destruction of enemy property. [xv]
In early 1701 Cronhjort
marched into Russia and reached the village of Saari (Шум), where according to
his information six boyars lived. Contrary to rumor no Russian force could be
found. The Swedes captured some peasants and a priest, who was released and
sent further into Russia with the King’s letter of protection. The prisoners said that the protection letter
was well known, but nobody dared to trust it. To prove that the promises were
reliable and to encourage the population Cronhjort retreated from Saari back to
Loppis. His intention was to proceed along the border, forcing unwilling
Russians to give contributions. He had also encouraged peasants from Noteborg
County to collect forage and unthreshed grain from the border area.
In mid-January Cronhjort
again crossed into Russia, establishing his headquarters at Vasilkovo. In his
letters to the King he continued to report that the Russians were unwilling to
give contributions. He also pointed out his shortage of artillery and
ammunition, but on the 17th he was ready to again advance to Saari.
The siege of Saari
From Cronhjort’s own reports
it’s possible to piece together what happened at Saari. It would seem that he
fairly easily managed to cross the river at which point the opposing Russian
cavalry retreated and the infantry took cover in a fortified wooden manor. Due
to its position and the strong defenses Cronhjort was unable to use his
cavalry, so he first tried to persuade the Russians to surrender. When this
failed he attempted to set fire to the houses, but his untrained soldiers were
hesitant in the face of heavy defensive fire. On the 21st Cronhjort
made a new attempt to attack, but again without success. He then prepared 3
sledges with flammable material, which in the morning of the 23rd
were pushed towards the manor. It was twice set on fire, but the Russians
countered by pouring out water through the roof and even managed to push one of
the sledges away. The deep snow made it difficult for the Swedish infantry to
come up in support fast enough. After having 81 men killed or wounded Cronhjort
appealed to the King for some mortars, but also made it clear that he had
prepared a new round of incendiary devices which he believed would be
successful. The Major General also
reported that according to some prisoners taken during an expedition towards
Ladoga a relief force was gathering at Novgorod. The prisoners did not know who
was commanding the defenders at Saari, but Cronhjort was sure that it must be a
Pole or Saxon as he had proved to be very cunning.
On the 26th the
mortars finally arrived, but before these could prove decisive the Russian
defenders managed to sneak out and disappear under cover of darkness. In his
report to Charles on the 29th Cronhjort tried to show that the manor
had been almost impossible to take without a large loss of life, but he
promised a full inquest into the circumstances surrounding the defenders
successful escape. He also reported that according to rumor the Czar had gone
to Moscow to prepare the dispatch of a peace delegation.[xvi]
The events at Saari were
undoubtedly most embarrassing to Cronhjort and Charles XII made this clear in a
letter dated 1 February. At that time
the King did not yet know how the siege had ended, but he pointed out that
Cronhjort just before Christmas had implied that he would be capable to march
as far as Novgorod and force large areas to give contributions. In light of
this – how could Cronhjort find it so difficult to capture a “poor wooden
manor”?[xvii]
On 1 February Cronhjort
again reported to Charles, saying that he had taken 2 000 cavalry and
dragoons on an expedition further into Russia burning houses and manors and
then retreating back to Loppis. He also stated that some on the Russian side of
the Järvisaari (Ярвосоль) and Lissila (Ли́сино) border had been prepared to
give contributions, but some peasants from Ingria had attacked them. To stop
further actions like this Cronhjort had sent 300 cavalry and dragoons to keep
order. [xviii]
On 4 February Cronhjort
returned to the subject. In view of the fact that the peasant’s actions had
resulted in Russian reprisals, he had forbidden further such excursions and was
inclined to punish the culprits. In his reply a few days later Charles XII
strongly disagreed. He saw no reason why the peasants should be punished and
instructed Cronhjort to let them burn as much as they wished. Shortly
thereafter Cronhjort abandoned the campaign and let his troops go into winter
quarters. [xix]
On the defensive
In late May 1701 Charles XII
granted Cronhjort full powers on the Ingrian theatre of war, i.e. he could
handle the defense as he saw fit and would answer to the King only.[xx]
Charles had already made it clear to both Apolloff in Nyen and Schlippenbach in
Noteborg that they were under the command of Cronhjort, regardless of Major
General Horn’s appointment as supreme commander of the fortresses in Ingria. As
the Royal Army started marching southwards, eventually crossing the Daugava and
occupying Courland, the King’s knowledge of the situation in Ingria diminished
and he became increasingly reluctant to give firm orders. In an instruction
dated 4 June Charles emphasized the importance of protecting the fortresses,
particularly Nyen and Noteborg, but left the conduct of operations to
Cronhjort. When the latter on 5 June asked for specific instructions on how to
conduct operations Charles simply replied that he had already been given a free
hand and should act accordingly. On 16 June Charles wrote Cronhjort, telling
him to make a diversion into Russia – one of the last times the Major General was
given specific orders on how to proceed.[xxi] When the King’s own army was given top
priority and the Courland-Lithuanian area increased in importance as Charles
got more and more involved with Augustus II’s Polish and Lithuanian opponents,
the Russian forays into Livonia placed Schlippenbach’s army next on the list.
The Ingrian theatre of war was not forgotten, but it was firmly in the shadow
of events elsewhere.
Cronhjort’s position as
supreme commander in Ingria, answerable only to the King made opposition to his
orders very difficult. In May 1701 Cronhjort ordered Schlippenbach at Noteborg
to equip a few small boats and send them on reconnaissance missions. The
garrison commander’s was opposed to this and asked Major General Horn for
advice. Horn told Schlippenbach that he had every right to refuse to carry out
such orders if he considered them harmful to the defense of the fortress.
Cronhjort reacted furiously, telling Schlippenbach in no uncertain terms that
the King had given him supreme authority over both the army and the garrisons
at Nyen and Noteborg.[xxii]
In July Horn objected to Cronhjort’s handling of the defense, suggesting that
it would be better to keep most of the army stationed on the southern border of
Ingria and strong detachments at the furthest eastern and western points. If
this was combined with small posts placed at intervals of 10 km Cronhjort
would, Horn claimed, in six hours know of any Russian foray into Ingria. Horn
even tried to enlist Governor General Dahlbergh in Riga in an effort to
persuade the King to intervene, but to no avail.[xxiii]
In the autumn of 1701 complaints against Cronhjort reached Defensionskommissionen. He had, they were told, allowed many
officers and soldiers to leave the army at Loppis and go home, putting Ingria
at risk. The Committee tried to intervene, but were basically told by Cronhjort
that it was none of their business as he had been appointed by the King and
answered to nobody but him. The Committee had however taken certain precautions
by informing Charles XII and he fully supported their action.[xxiv]
Prelude to Noteborg
In early July 1702 Cronhjort
made a foray into Russia, but was forced back by heavy rain. He then went back
to Nyen, where he mostly had his headquarters during this period. In late July
new reports claimed that a large Russian force was gathering in the east and
the Swedish outposts near Loppis were forced back. The area, which already had
suffered badly during a previous expedition, was again devastated. The Russians
pressed on towards Ingris (Ижора), where they on 14 August were attacked by
Cronhjort’s cavalry. Despite some success Cronhjort considered it impossible to
remain at Ingris and soon retreated.[xxv]
On 26 August he wrote to Governor General Frölich in Riga, expressing pessimism
in regard to his ability to protect Ingria against further attacks by
overwhelming enemy forces. About two weeks later he sounded more optimistic,
telling Defensionskommissionen that
the Russians suddenly had withdrawn from their camp at Ingris. Cronhjort
claimed that he had intended to pursue the retreating Russians, but that severe
rains made this impossible. At this point he even seemed inclined to believe
that nothing more would happen before winter arrived.[xxvi]
However, in mid-September
worrying news arrived. Russian parties had observed near Noteborg and on the 12th
a large force had been seen marching past the fortress.[xxvii]
At this time Cronhjort was preparing to let his army go into winter quarters.
Towards the end of September large Russian forces began to assemble near
Noteborg. This was the first time that any of the key positions in Ingria was
under serious attack. How would Cronhjort respond?
Cronhjort and the siege of Nöteborg
Cronhjort was quickly
informed about the attack on Nöteborg. In a letter to Defensionskommissionen on 2 October he reported that he had immediately
sent a major, some officers and as many soldiers as he could, along with
medical supplies. Much more could, he feared, not be done as his army was weak
and poorly equipped. Four days later Cronhjort reported more Russian advances
into Ingria and that Schlippenbach at Nöteborg had informed him that the
besiegers seemed to prepare a descent on the northern shore of the Ladoga. This
had caused Cronhjort to dispatch 300 men with 4 guns, but this force had
arrived too late to stop the crossing and was defeated. Cronhjort stated that
he had given up the defense of the southern shore of the Neva and was
concentrating on holding his ground on the northern. At his disposal he had
only 4 000 soldiers, poorly fed and poorly equipped. The Carelian peasants
had abandoned their posts, so there was no help to be found anywhere.[xxviii]
The Nyen disaster
After the fall of Nöteborg
on 13 October there was considerable nervousness on the Swedish side. When some
Kalmyks a week later appeared near Nyen panic broke out. The Swedish outposts
fled towards the town, which caused Cronhjort to withdraw northwards. At this
point the garrison commander Johan Apolloff set the town on fire, believing
that an attack on the fortress was imminent. In the process large supplies were
destroyed – and no attack on the fortress materialized.[xxix]
While the fall of Nöteborg severely hurt Cronhjort’s reputation, this proved to
be a fatal blow. Major General Horn in Narva had long been a critic of his
dispositions, the former commander of Nöteborg G. W. Schlippenbach resented the
lack of assistance from the army during the siege, Apolloff wanted to absolve
himself from blame for the destruction of Nyen and the commander of the Ladoga
squadron Vice Admiral Numers was unhappy with the lack of support given by
Cronhjort during the campaigns of 1701 and 1702. Horn also forwarded complaints
from civilian authorities in Ingria, who were unhappy with how the army had
treated the peasants. The County Governor Lindehielm in Viborg added to this
chorus of criticism.[xxx]
The matter clearly was something Defensionskommissionen
could not wave aside. Something must be done – but what? Cronhjort had been
appointed by Charles XII and was responsible only to him. Could the government
in Stockholm remove Cronhjort without consulting the King?
The effort to have Cronhjort removed
On 5 November Defensionskommissionen met to discuss
the latest news from Ingria. Reports the events at Nyen had reached Stockholm
and the committee members were upset. They agreed that a sharply worded rebuke
should be sent to Cronhjort, but the Governor of Stockholm, Lieutenant General
Kristofer Gyllenstierna was not satisfied. Somebody should be sent over to
assist Cronhjort, who was and old man and not as vigorous as he once was. If
this person was put in charge of the peasants, he could help Cronhjort mount a
stronger defense. This solution would mean no infringement on the latter’s
authority, as he was only in charge of the army. However, soon new letters were
brought in. Lindehielm reported about a lack of discipline in Cronhjort’s army
and suggested that somebody be sent to assist Cronhjort along with 4-5 000
in reinforcements. At this point the powerful Count Fabian Wrede suggested that
Cronhjort was too old and frail to command the necessary authority. The
complaints from Horn, Lindehielm, Apolloff and others, especially in regard to
the lack of discipline, could not be disregarded. The discussion turned
serious. Surely the King would best be served if Cronhjort was replaced by
someone else and allowed to go back to his post as County Governor? If the
Major General was told that his presence was needed back in Helsinki it could
perhaps help ease the blow? The matter was very delicate and the change, it was
decided, could not be made by the Committee. The Council of Realm must be
consulted, as they had the authority to step in when something was so urgent
that it was impossible to wait for the King’s decision. Johan Gabriel Stenbock
noted that a decision would need to be made quickly and whoever was appointed
as a replacement must also be given the necessary resources.[xxxi]
Apparently even the Council considered the
matter too hot to handle, so on 28 November the issue was back in Defensionskommissionen. In light of so
many complaints the Committee decided to write Charles XII and tell him that
the situation called for replacing the aging Cronhjort. This letter, dated
Stockholm 15 December 1702, seems to have reached the King as late as March
1703.[xxxii]
On 5 April Charles reacted, appointing Major General Georg Johan Maydell (Commander
of the Tavastehus infantry regiment)
as Cronhjort’s replacement. Maydell was also promoted to Lieutenant General.
The same day Charles XII wrote to Cronhjort, informing him that he was needed
in Helsinki and should return to his position as County Governor as soon as
Maydell arrived.[xxxiii]
After having survived various complaints over the course of two years the end
had come for the old Major General. The news reached him at the beginning of
May and he reacted with considerable bitterness, suggesting that devious
intrigues behind his back finally had been successful. Cronhjort asked for an
investigation, which he believed would show his innocence.[xxxiv]
After having turned over the army to Maydell at the beginning of September
1703, Cronhjort returned to Helsinki. There he died 2 months later, without
having had the opportunity to present his case to the authorities in Stockholm.
[i] Latvijas
Valsts vēstures arhīvs (LVVA), Fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 72, Erik Dahlbergh to
Charles XII 12 February 1700.
[ii] For the details, see Viljanti,
A., Suomen rykmenttien liikekannallo ja marssi Liivinmaale v. 1700 //
Historiallinen Arkisto. 45. 1939. P. 303-355.
[iii] For the numbers, see
Nordensvan, C. O., Svenska armén åren 1700-1709 // Karolinska Förbundets
Årsbok. 1916. P.
120-180
[iv] It’s also the figure given by Cronhjort, see
Krigsarkivet (KrA),Krigskollegium, Krigskollegii kansli E c: 64, Cronhjort to Krigskollegium
16 August 1700.
[v] The discussions have
been analyzed in Persson, R., Rustningarna i Sverige under det stora nordiska
kriget. Lund, 1973.
[ix] KrA, Biografica,
Cronhjort; Lewenhaupt, A., Karl XII:s officerare. Vol. 1. Stockholm, 1920. P.
126
[x] DelaGardiska archivet.
Vol.13. Lund, 1840. P. 187-191, Letter from Otto Vellingk to Fabian Wrede 2
January 1701.
[xi] RA, ÄK 243, vol. 77,
Anders Lindehielm to Defensionskommissionen 12 December 1700.
[xii] RA, Skrivelser till
Konungen, ser. 1, vol. 5, Cronhjort to Charles XII 14 December 1700. For the
letter of protection, see Riksregistraturet 3 December 1700.
[xiii] RA, Skrivelser till
Konungen, ser. 1, vol. 5, Cronhjort to Charles XII 15 December 1700.
[xiv]
The King’s orders in RA, Riksregistraturet. For Cronhjort’s reports to Charles,
see RA, Skrivelser till Konungen. Ser 1. Vol. 5.
[xv]
RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles XII to Cronhjort 28 December 1700.
[xvi] For
the events at Saari, see RA, Skrivelser till Konungen. Ser. 1, Vol. 5,
Cronhjort to Charles XII 24 and 29
January; RA, ÄK 243, A. Lindehielm to Defensionskommissionen 20, 23, 27, 29
January and 2 February 1702.
[xix] For
a general description of the campaign in Ingria during early 1701, see also
Rosen, C. von, Bidrag till kännedom om de händelser… Vol. 2:2. Stockholm, 1936.
P. 7-10.
[xxiii] LVVA,
Fond 7349, op. 1. Vol. 276, H. R. Horn to Erik Dahlbergh 7 July 1701.The same
complaint apparently reached Stockholm, see Åkerhielm, S., Samuel Agriconius
Åkerhielms brev till Josias Cederhielm och Mauritz Vellingk 1700-1702.
Stockholm, 1979. P. 64-65, Samuel Åkerhielm to Josias Cederhielm 23 July 1701.
[xxiv] RA,
ÄK 243, vol. 86, Cronhjort to Defensionskommissionen 9 October 1701; RA,
Riksregistraturet, Charles XII to Cronhjort 18 October 1701.
[xxv]
LVVA, Fond 7349, op. 1, vol. 311, Cronhjort to K. G. Frölich 26 August 1702
(with a separate description of events during August).
[xxix] Ibid,
Cronhjort to Defensionskommissionen 21 and 28 October 1702 (with testimony from
Lieutenant Colonels H. O. Brakel, B. W. Rehbinder, C. von Hagen and Major R. J.
de la Barre); J. Apolloff to Defensionskommissionen 22 and 30 October (with testimony
from Lieutenant Colonel H. Köhler and Captain A. G. Zweibergk)
[xxx]
Ibid., H. R. Horn to Defensionskommissionen 6 September (with copy of letter from bailiff Björn
Finne) 31 October (with copies of several letters from Apolloff to Horn) and 3
November 1702; RA, ÄK 243, vol. 91, A. Lindehielm to Defensionskommissionen 24
and 28 October 1702 (with copy of a letter from Apolloff dated 25 October). See also note 32.
[xxxi] RA, ÄK 243, vol. 1.
[xxxii] Historiska handlingar.
Vol. 2. Stockholm, 1862. P. 261-268
[xxxiii] RA,
Riksregistraturet, Charles XII to G. J. Maydell
and A. Cronhjort 5 April 1703. The King had in fact already in late 1702,
upon receiving news of Nöteborg’s surrender, expressed dissatisfaction with
Cronhjort, see DelaGardiska archivet. Vol.13. Lund, 1840. P. 164-165, Excerpt
from letter from Axel Sparre to Fabian Wrede 3 December 1702. Sparre mentions
severe complaints already in 1701, but states that certain people had supported
Cronhjort.
[xxxiv] RA, ÄK 243, vol. 107,
Cronhjort to Defensionskommissionen 8 May 1703.
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